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Abstract: 
The importance of the precautionary saving motive for households’ 
saving behaviour is unquestioned in the literature of the last two 
decades. However, the magnitude of precautionary savings and its 
influencing factors could not be satisfactorily determined. A 
subjective measure of the desired amount of precautionary savings 
in the German SAVE study 2005-2007 allows for the evaluation of 
these questions on a new basis without relying on a specific 
definition of wealth. This study supports the view of a low or at most 
moderate contribution of precautionary savings to wealth 
accumulation ranging from 6% for total net wealth to 26% for 
financial wealth. Carroll’s buffer-stock model (1992, 1997) is 
introduced since it establishes the theoretical foundation of this 
study. In a multivariate data analysis, the panel structure and the 
wide range of theoretically relevant variables available in the SAVE 
datasets allows investigating the factors which influence the 
subjective measure of the desired amount of precautionary savings. 
Education, current income, variables which reflect a precautionary 
attitude, bequest and old-age provision motives have strong and 
significant effects in the expected way. The variables for individual 
income risk have the expected sign over all specifications. However, 
they remain insignificant at the usual significance levels, which can 
be due to the construction of these variables or the German social 
insurance and welfare system.  
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1 Introduction 
The decision on how much to save and therewith how much to 
consume is one of the most important economic decisions 
households have to face. However, this decision is still not very well 
understood. The complexity of this decision is founded in the 
intertemporal horizon and in the forward-looking behaviour of 
agents, as well as the different motives to save and the interaction 
among these motives. Generally, today’s savings are tomorrow’s 
consumption which causes utility in one way or another. The range 
of how the savings could be consumed is wide, whether invested in 
daily needs, in the purchase of a home, in the children’s education, 
in bequests to children for their consumption, or in travelling. 
Another saving motive, the precautionary saving motive, has gained 
more and more attention in the last 20 years, and its fundamental 
role has been emphasised in a wide range of economic literature. 
The idea of precautionary savings is summarised in the additional 
savings accumulated for preparing for unforeseen events. 
Precautionary savings as any other kind of savings can be increased 
in two ways: first, a reduction in consumption at constant labour 
supply or, second, a rise in the labour supply at constant 
consumption (Carroll & Kimball, 2007, p. 2).  
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Figure 1: Importance of the saving motive for unexpected events 
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But how important is the precautionary saving motive? One possible 
way to answer this question is a comparison of the importance of 
different saving motives. Looking at the German SAVE study, 
which is explained in detail in chapter 3, figure 1 shows that most 
heads of households assign a relatively high importance to the 
precautionary saving motive given the range from 0 (unimportant) 
to 10 (very important). Figure 2 compares the mean of the 
importance over different saving motives. It can be seen that 
together with the old-age provision motive, the motive for savings 
for unforeseen events is the most important saving motive. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of different saving motives 
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Similar results were found in the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) for the US (Carroll, 1997, p. 1). Understanding the saving 
process serves not only a self purpose, but rather it is needed for a 
well-directed economic policy. In the case of precautionary savings, 
public social insurances have an impact on certain risks like health, 
unemployment (Kazarosian, 1997, p. 246) or the risk of poverty in 
old age, which influence the amount of precautionary savings and 
automatically the personal saving rate.2 The personal saving rate 
                                                     
2 As Krueger and Kubler (2006, pp. 737-738) state, a pay-as-you go social 
security system crowds out private savings, reduces the capital stock and 
diminishes the growth of the economy of future generations compared to 
an investment-based social security programme. On the other side it 
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itself is linked to the capital stock and the capital stock to economic 
growth. Further on, there is a link between precautionary savings 
and the impact of government debt as Barsky & Mankiw & Zeldes 
(1986) examined.3 From these points of view, understanding the 
precautionary saving motive, its influencing factors, its role in the 
saving process, and the linkage to other saving motives over the life-
cycle is of fundamental relevance for understanding the saving 
behaviour of households.   
 
This study deals with the analysis of the precautionary saving 
motive in the Germany using a subjective measurement of the 
desired amount of precautionary savings of the SAVE study 2005-
2007. The aim of this study is to answer the following research 
question: “Which factors influence the subjective measure of the 
desired amount of precautionary savings and to what extent?” To 
answer this question, the existent theoretical models and empirical 
work are investigated first. Afterwards, the findings are used to 
prepare and analyse the SAVE dataset from 2005-2007. For this 
analysis, the SAVE dataset offers a wide range of appealing 
characteristics to answer this question:  
                                                                                                               
allows for intergenerational risk sharing. This comes into play if there are 
aggregate shocks to labour and capital income and the returns to wages 
and capital are imperfectly correlated. This again reduces savings via the 
precautionary channel.  
3 If future income is uncertain, a tax cut today, which is offset by an 
increase in future taxes, reduces uncertainty about future wealth since the 
tax cut provides certain wealth today. This reduced uncertainty leads to 
lower precautionary savings and to higher consumption today. 
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• Different definitions of wealth variables have been used as 
the explained variable to proxy precautionary savings. The 
new subjective measure of the desired amount of 
precautionary savings allows using the variable directly as 
the explained variable preventing the circumstance that the 
proxies are not a one-to-one map of precautionary savings. 
This procedure was chosen by Kennickell & Lusardi (2005), 
who were the first to use a direct measure of precautionary 
savings as an explained variable.  
• All studies dealing with precautionary savings face the 
problem of creating a measurement of risk on the right hand 
side which is both observable or constructible and 
exogenous (Browning & Lusardi, 1996, p. 1835). In 
addition to income risk, this study implements measures for 
different kinds of risk that should influence precautionary 
savings from a theoretical point of view. Recent studies 
account for longevity risk (Palumbo, 1999; Lusardi, 1998; 
Kennickell & Lusardi, 2005), health risks (Kennickell & 
Lusardi, 2005; Kong & Lee & Lee, 2007), business risk 
(Kennickell & Lusardi, 2005), and pension uncertainty 
(Murata, 2003) in addition to the well known income risk. 
The SAVE survey offers proxies for most of the factors 
mentioned. 
• To estimate consistent coefficients of the variables of 
interest, SAVE makes it possible to include controls which 
have been found to be relevant from a theoretical and 
empirical perspective. 
1 Introduction 
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• Since the omitted variable bias is always a problem, the 
panel structure of the SAVE survey can control time 
invariant, unobserved variables. This increases the accuracy 
of the estimates. 
• For each year five multiple imputed SAVE datasets are 
available. Inference, which takes not only the variance 
within each dataset into account but also the variance 
between the datasets themselves, can be drawn on the basis 
of these five multiple imputed datasets.  
After the clarification of the research question and the possibilities 
offered by the SAVE dataset, definitions of the subject of interest 
are provided next. 
1.1 Definitions related to the precautionary saving motive 
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1.1 Definitions related to the precautionary saving 
motive 
To make the subject of this course clear, definitions are provided in 
this section. It is helpful to call to attention the distinction between 
precautionary saving and precautionary savings. As Carroll & 
Kimball (2007) point out in their introduction, precautionary saving 
is a flow figure, whereas precautionary savings is the size of stock 
of precautionary saving accumulated in the past. After this 
clarification, I use precautionary savings and precautionary wealth 
as synonyms. Leland (1968), who was the first to set up a two 
period model that included the precautionary saving motive, defines 
“precautionary demand for saving … as the extra saving caused by 
future income being random rather than determinate” (Leland, 1968, 
p. 465). What Leland meant by being random is not clear. In 
economics, a distinction between risk and uncertainty is made 
(Menz, 2007, pp. 9-10). The economic understanding of risk is that 
an individual can assign certain probabilities to different states of 
nature, whereas uncertainty cannot be quantified (Dictionary of 
economics, 2003, pp. 338, 390). Since risk contains measurable 
probabilities, insurances can step in. Carroll & Kimball (2006, p. 2) 
define that “precautionary saving is additional saving that results 
from the knowledge that the future is uncertain.” My interpretation 
of this definition is that precautionary saving results from 
perceptional uncertainty. Further on, they expand future uncertainty 
beyond income uncertainty.  
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To define precautionary savings in a more satisfactory way for this 
study, “background uncertainty” is defined first. In this study 
“background uncertainty” is defined as the perceptional risk and 
uncertainty influencing present or future consumption of an 
individual, whereby, first, the individual is not able or, second, not 
willing to insure against the risk. The first point comes from the fact 
that there is a lack of insurance based on the absence of full 
information or control of the insurance company, leading to adverse 
selection or moral hazard of the individuals insured. Moreover, an 
insurance contract cannot be feasible, because the estimation of the 
damage distribution function is not known such as for natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks. Second, individuals may not be well 
informed about available insurance contracts or information and 
evaluation costs for insurances against every insurable risk may be 
too high. Precautionary savings are thus defined as the additional 
amount of savings of an individual facing background uncertainty 
compared to an individual with the same expected income path 
without facing any background uncertainty. This definition of 
precautionary savings is roughly similar to the definition of 
Gourinchas & Parker (2002, pp. 75-76). They split total wealth in 
buffer and life-cycle wealth, whereby the buffer wealth corresponds 
closely to the definition of precautionary savings used here. This 
discussion and the quotes of definitions of precautionary savings 
should help to better understand what precautionary savings stand 
for, and it should raise awareness of the complexity of this topic. As 
Essig (2005, p. 6) mentioned, the exact definition of precautionary 
savings, the question of which risks it should insure against and in 
which time horizon, is still not clear. 
1.2 Empirical evidence and magnitude of precautionary savings 
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1.2 Empirical evidence and magnitude of 
precautionary savings 
Much work has been done related to the precautionary saving 
motive based on different approaches. This study is classified in the 
micro-empirical work on precautionary savings, which tries to link 
wealth and uncertainty directly. In contrast to simulation approaches 
like Zeldes (1989b) or Carroll (1997), micro panel data allow for a 
direct test whether people change their behaviour due to changes in 
risk according to theoretical predictions. Compared to structural 
estimation approaches (Gourinchas & Parker, 2002; Cagetti, 2003), 
it is less restrictive in its assumptions. However, the estimation of 
model implied parameters is not possible since no well defined 
model underlies the estimation.  
 
Empirical evidence on the importance of precautionary savings is 
mostly based on reduced form regressions of net worth or financial 
assets on proxies for income risk. The regression results range from 
no significant influence of the precautionary saving motive to the 
accumulation of different measures of wealth (Skinner, 1988), to a 
small influence between 1%-4.5% (Guiso & Jappelli & Terlizzese, 
1992; Lusardi, 1997, 1998; Arrondel, 2002), and to results up to 
more than 50% (Carroll & Samwick, 1998). Two relatively recent 
studies quantified the contribution of precautionary savings to 
financial wealth in Germany. Whereas Bartzsch (2006, p. 15) found 
a share of precautionary savings relative to financial wealth of 
20.6% on average, Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln (2005, p. 1101) 
identified a contribution of 22.1% for East Germany and 12.9% for 
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West Germany. For an overview of studies investigating the 
importance of the precautionary saving motive see table A.3 in the 
appendix. This table provides information about the authors, the 
country, the dataset and the investigated time period, the dependent 
and independent variables, and the main results. This overview is 
not limited to regression based studies, but also includes examples 
of structural estimation approaches and Euler equation methods like 
that one of Dynan (1993). This wide range of results offered in table 
A.3 is due to different dependent variables caused by different 
definitions of wealth, unequal controls and risk variables, as well as 
varying estimation techniques and functional forms in addition to 
different datasets in varying time periods.   
 
The variety of empirical results makes an ongoing investigation 
necessary. After the importance of the precautionary saving motive 
has been clarified, definitions have been provided and the research 
question of this study and its new possibilities have been introduced; 
the remainder of this study is organised as follows:  
Section 2 gives an overview of the theoretical modelling of 
precautionary savings; section 3 introduces the dataset of the 
German SAVE Survey of 2005-2007 and discusses the applied 
imputation procedure in more depth; section 4 presents descriptive 
statistics of precautionary savings, whereas section 5 establishes the 
underlying empirical equation for the estimation; section 6 outlines 
the estimation techniques adapted, and section 7 describes and 
discusses the results; section 8 concludes and gives a perspective for 
further research. 
2.1 The standard life-cycle model 
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2 Theory 
2.1 The standard life-cycle model 
Before this study goes into the theoretical details of models 
incorporating the precautionary saving motive, the origin of these 
models, the standard life-cycle model, is introduced first. In contrast 
to the traditional Keynesian consumption function in which 
consumption is a function of current disposable income, the 
permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) argues that 
consumption is a function of permanent income, where permanent 
income is defined as the agent’s total lifetime resources divided by 
the number of periods the agent is going to live (Romer, 2006, pp. 
347-348). In addition, Modigliani & Brumberg (1954) showed that 
rational agents try to smooth their consumption over their entire life-
cycle. Hence, the neoclassical life-cycle-permanent-income 
hypothesis was born (hereinafter referred to as the standard life-
cycle model). The result of the standard life-cycle model derives 
from an intertemporal utility maximisation problem of a rational, 
forward looking agent who is maximising his life-time utility by 
choosing the optimal amount of consumption in each period. 
Assuming that the life-cycle utility is the sum of discounted values 
of future utility, where the utility function is additively separable 
over time and the function is the same over all periods and has a 
positive but decreasing marginal utility, the agent tries to smooth 
consumption over his life-cycle. The instruments to do this are 
borrowing and saving. The agent will borrow, if his current income 
2 Theory 
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is below his permanent income, and he will save, if his current 
income is above his permanent income. Moving life-cycle resources 
from one period to another is undertaken until the marginal utility of 
consumption is constant over time. Figure 3 pictures the typical 
development of consumption, current income, and saving over the 
life-cycle.  
Figure 3: Consumption, income, and saving over the life-cycle 
 
 
As shown in the figure, young households should borrow money to 
finance their consumption level (phase A), whereas households 
should pay off their accumulated debts and accumulate wealth in 
phase B, from which they can consume in phase C. Thus, the 
standard life-cycle model induces an old-age provision motive 
(Schunk, 2007b, p. 9). The more interested reader is referred to the 
articles of Browning & Lusardi (1996) and Rodepeter (1999), which 
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give a detailed overview of the theories and the assumptions of the 
standard life-cycle model and its extensions. 
However, the standard life-cycle model cannot explain a wide range 
of empirical puzzles. Only two puzzling facts are mentioned here. 
First, as Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) point out, in Germany elderly 
people do not dissave on average, since median or mean savings and 
also saving rates by cohort or cross section remain positive in old 
age despite a very generous pensions and health systems. This result 
is in contrast to the predictions of life-cycle models. To introduce 
the bequest motive can help to explain the so-called “German 
Saving Puzzle”, but as mentioned by Börsch-Supan et al. (2003, p. 
15), bequests can be the result of an accident, a strategy, or 
decreased consumption caused by weak health. A result which 
underpins this argumentation is that bequests do not seem to be 
related to the number of children in a household (Börsch-Supan & 
Essig, 2002, pp. 16-17; Hurd, 1987).  
 
The second puzzle, which is strongly related to the importance of 
the precautionary saving motive in the life-cycle process, is the 
evidence Carroll & Summers presented in their article in 1991.  
They found that consumption growth tracks income growth very 
closely over the life-cycle in different occupational groups (pp. 318-
327) and that consumption growth is high in countries in which 
income growth is high and vice versa (pp. 308-315). These stylized 
facts contradict important results of the rational expectation version 
of the permanent-income hypothesis for consumption. To name only 
one, there should be no parallel movement of income and 
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consumption, since the anticipated growth rate of income should not 
be correlated to the growth rate of consumption (p. 306).  
 
For the inverted u-shape of income and consumption within a 
working life, known as the income/consumption parallel in low 
frequency data, researchers investigated several explanations (see 
Browning & Crossley (2001, pp. 12-14) for a summarisation of the 
explanations). One of the most promising explanations (Carroll, 
1997, pp. 34-38) was enabled through the extension of the standard 
life-cycle model with the introduction of a precautionary motive 
(Browning & Lusardi, 1996, p. 1798). This saving motive allows 
possible explanations for other empirical observations too (Guiso et 
al., 1992, p. 308). The next section of this study summarises the 
development of life-cycle models extended by the precautionary 
saving motive until they were able to explain the inverted u-shape of 
income and consumption mentioned above. Subsequently, one of 
the most famous models including the precautionary saving motive 
is introduced from which an explanation for the 
income/consumption parallel in low frequency data can be derived. 
 
But before the theory of precautionary saving is expanded, other 
extensions of the life-cycle model and new approaches must also 
receive special attention and should be briefly mentioned; that is 
liquidity constraints and new approaches through behavioural 
economics (Browning & Lusardi, 1996, pp. 1846-1848). Liquidity 
constraints appear if households are not able to borrow. Binding as 
well as not currently binding liquidity constraints reduce 
2.1 The standard life-cycle model 
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consumption today (Zeldes, 1989a, p. 314). Deaton’s (1991) 
interaction of liquidity constraints and an uncertain labour income 
induces precautionary savings. 
 
The new approaches through behavioural economics question the 
general framework of life-cycle models. Thaler (1994, pp. 186-188) 
addressed three criticisms to life-cycle models. First, to find the 
optimal consumption rule, the household has to solve an 
intertemporal dynamic maximisation problem. This is even hard for 
an economist, since these problems can be quite complex. In 
addition to that, the household has to make assumptions about, for 
example, its utility function and has to build expectations about 
future income flows, the likelihood of dying, and risk of medical 
expenditures. In addition, the possibility of learning is practically 
very limited. Only learning from others or following good rules of 
thumb may help to get close to the optimal consumption path. 
Rodepeter & Winter (1999) evaluated different rules of thumb 
compared to the optimal solution. Not only bounded rationally is a 
concern, which is founded in limited mental capabilities, but also 
the lack of self-control some households face, which is the second 
criticism of Thaler. Today households are seduced into 
consumption. Their preferences are time-inconsistent. A relative 
new model, which is able to incorporate time-inconsistent 
preferences and other phenomena, is the “dual-self” model of 
Fudenberg & Levine (2006). The third point mentioned by Thaler is 
the assumption of fungibility. Households do not treat every source 
of wealth equally for their consumption purposes. Their changing 
propensity to consume out of wealth is assumed to be founded in 
2 Theory 
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different “mental accounts” (Thaler, 1990). Other points which 
should be added are the influences of social norms on an 
individual’s behaviour (Akerlof, 2007) or the effect of social 
context, which is paraphrased as “keeping up with the Jones” 
(Lavoie, 2004, pp. 641, 647). 
2.2 Development of models including uncertainty 
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2.2 Development of models including uncertainty  
In 1968, Leland was the first who introduced the effect of 
uncertainty on savings in a formal analysis of a two-period model of 
consumption. The setup for the two-period model is a known labour 
income y1 in period 1 and the distribution of Y2, the uncertain labour 
income in period 2. Assuming additive utilities (UG = U1+U2), the 
consumption in period 1 (c1) should be chosen in a way that 
E[U(c1,(1+r)(y1-c1)+Y2] is maximised. His article already points out 
that the concept of risk aversion alone is not able to capture higher 
saving by increasing wage uncertainty. Precautionary demand for 
saving is the result of concavity and a positive third derivative of the 
utility function. Therefore, certainty equivalence models like that 
famous one of Hall (1978), which uses a quadratic utility function, 
are not able to deal with income uncertainty, since the income 
variance is not included in the consumption function if the third 
derivative is zero. Leland as well as Sibley (1975, pp. 76-78) and 
Miller (1976), who expanded Leland’s two-period model to a multi-
period one, conclude that with a positive third derivative of the 
utility function, precautionary savings will rise in the presence of 
income uncertainty. A positive third derivative is, for example, the 
result of utility functions with decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
 
Based on these insights, Kimball (1990a) introduced the concepts of 
absolute and relative prudence parallel to the Arrow-Pratt measure 
of absolute and relative risk aversion. “Prudence”, which is a 
property of utility functions, leads to higher savings with increasing 
background uncertainty. In contrast to risk aversion, which is based 
2 Theory 
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on the negative second derivative of a utility function, the third 
derivative of a utility function needs to be positive in the presence of 
prudence. Expanding the life-cycle model through precautionary 
savings broadens the model’s horizon. It is by far less restrictive 
than the certainty equivalence models and allows for the modelling 
of more complex behaviour (Browning & Lusardi, 1996, pp. 1798, 
1808). 
 
A further step was undertaken by Zeldes (1989b). Zeldes was the 
first to use numerical methods to approximate the optimal 
consumption rules of some multi-period problems based on constant 
relative risk aversion utility functions. These numerical methods are 
necessary since there are no closed-form decision rules for optimal 
consumption functions with more realistic assumptions than the 
certainty-equivalence models, which do not allow for precautionary 
savings. In particular, this is valid for constant relative risk aversion 
utility functions (excluding closed-form solutions for constant 
absolute risk aversion utility functions [which are implausible, see 
Kimball, 1990b, for arguments]). 
 
Computer simulations were also used by Carroll to develop the so-
called buffer-stock model of saving. Since the econometric equation 
developed in this paper is influenced by this model, the buffer-stock 
model and its implications are introduced in the next section. 
2.3 The buffer-stock model of saving 
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2.3 The buffer-stock model of saving 
The buffer-stock model of saving was developed by Carroll (1992, 
1997) and is closely related to the models of Zeldes (1989b) and 
Deaton (1991). The decision-unit in this model is an impatient and 
prudent household. Impatience is the preference to consume today 
compared to consuming tomorrow in the sense that the household 
would like to borrow against future income if the income is constant 
over time and there is no uncertainty. Furthermore, the household 
raises savings in the presence of increasing uncertainty, which is 
implemented by a “prudent” utility function with a positive third 
derivative. While prudence induces higher consumption in future 
periods, impatience drives consumption to increase in the presence. 
This tension leads to an optimal and unique wealth to income ratio if 
the parameters of the model are chosen in a plausible range as done 
by Carroll (1992, 1997). If the individual is below the optimal stock 
of wealth, prudence dominates impatience and increases savings 
until the optimal stock of wealth is reached. If the opposite is the 
case, impatience dominates prudence and will decrease savings up 
to the optimal level.  This result is attractive, since it is similar to a 
rule of thumb behaviour suggested by financial planning guides 
(Carroll, 1997, p. 46). The behaviour suggested by the financial 
planning guides is to hold a certain multiple of (permanent) income 
as buffer-stock for unforeseen events. However, this advice does not 
answer the question what the optimal wealth to permanent income 
target should be. Exactly this gap is filled by the buffer-stock model. 
In the following, the model structure of the buffer-stock model is 
explained and the main results are presented. Afterwards, the power 
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and limitations of the model are mentioned. The next section 
concludes with implications of the buffer-stock model for the 
research question being investigated. 
2.3.1 Theoretical foundation of the buffer-stock model 
To ease the determination of a solution for the decision problem, the 
buffer-stock model structures the decision problem rigorously via 
several assumptions. The consumer faces the following stylized 
intertemporal maximisation problem (Carroll, 1992, pp. 72-73; 
Carroll, 1997, pp. 5-6): 
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where the subscript t denotes the time period and T is the time of 
death, Wt is net wealth, YLt is non-capital income (labour income), 
Pt is permanent income, Ct is consumption, Vt is a multiplicative 
transitory and Nt a multiplicative permanent shock, g is the growth 
rate of permanent income, δ is the discount rate, and r is the interest 
rate. Furthermore, a CRRA utility function ( ρ1Cu(C) ρ1 −= − ) is 
assumed, where ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which 
equals the coefficient of relative prudence minus one in the case of a 
CRRA utility function. In addition, the current resources or cash on 
hand Xt is defined as Xt = Wt + YLt.  
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Setting ct = Ct/Pt and xt = Xt/Pt allows for reducing the number of 
variables from three to two, and the optimal consumption rule can 
be written in the form ct(xt). In the next step the parameters of the 
model (r, g, δ, ρ, σ²(lnVt), σ²(lnNt), p(YLt=0)) have to be estimated 
or defined. Since the way to model uncertainty is essential for the 
resulting buffer-stock behaviour, Carroll’s procedure is briefly 
outlined (Carroll, 1992, pp. 64-72). Using non-capital income YLit 
for each household i over a period from 1976 to 1985 of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a measure of permanent income 
iYL  for each household was calculated as the average of YLit over 
all time periods t. A iit YLYL variable was constructed leading to 
ten observations for each household. The distribution of this 
variable suggests that there is a certain probability of earning zero 
non-capital income, which was not due to measurement error. 
Carroll estimated the probability to be around 0.5% in each period. 
The rest of the distribution of iit YLYL indicates that both the 
transitory and the permanent income shocks follow a lognormal 
distribution. After a decomposition of the transitory and permanent 
shock, both were estimated. To obtain conservative estimates, 
Carroll finally assumed that the values are σlnN = σlnV = 0.1. 
 
Further on, attention should be paid to the implementation of 
impatience (Carroll, 1992, p. 74). To be impatient, the consumer 
must fulfil the condition gδ)(rρ 1 <−− , where δ)(rρ 1 −−  is the 
growth rate of consumption under certainty. It is derived from the 
fact that the expected present value of consumption and income 
should be equal over the life-cycle. As consumption growth is 
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smaller than permanent income growth g, current consumption is 
greater than current income and thus the consumer must be 
impatient. 
 
After estimating and defining all the parameters and their 
relationship, the optimal consumption rule is the result of a 
backward induction (Carroll, 1992, pp. 74-76, 128-130). In the case 
of certainty about the time of death and the absence of a bequest 
motive, it is optimal to consume all resources left over in the last 
period. Knowing the optimal behaviour in the last period, the 
consumer can solve backward the period-by-period Euler equations. 
Carroll found that the optimal consumption rules converge rapidly if 
the remaining life time is longer than ten years (Carroll, 1992, p. 
75). The buffer-stock behaviour of consumers can be explained best 
by the resulting log-linearised consumption Euler equation of the 
form (Carroll, 1997, p. 10):  
  1t1tt
1
1tt e)lnC( var2
ρδ)(rρΔlnCE ++
−
+ +Δ+−≈ ,  
where 1ttΔlnCE +  is the expected consumption growth rate, 
δ)(rρ 1 −−  is the consumption growth rate under certainty, and 
)lnC( var2
ρ
1tt +Δ  is additional consumption growth influenced by 
the coefficient of risk aversion or prudence ρ and the uncertainty in 
the labour income process. Figure 4 summarises some of the key 
properties of buffer-stock saving. For a more detailed discussion and 
the theoretical foundations see Carroll 1997 (pp. 11-15) and Carroll 
2004: 
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Figure 4: Expected consumption growth as a function of cash on hand 
 
Source: Carroll, 1997, p. 11: Figure 1a. 
• There exists a unique target of the cash on hand to 
permanent income ratio denoted by x*.  
• Households below the optimal target have a higher expected 
and declining consumption growth rate, since they save 
more to reach the optimal target value x*, and they reduce 
their savings when they get closer to the target value x*. 
Households above the optimal target value have a lower and 
increasing expected consumption growth rate, since they 
consume more to reach the optimal target value x*, and they 
reduce consumption when they get closer to the optimal 
target x*.  
• As cash on hand approaches infinity, the expected 
consumption growth rate converges to the consumption 
2 Theory 
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growth rate under certainty. As cash on hand converges to 
zero, the consumption growth rate increases to infinity.  
2.3.2 Power of the buffer-stock model 
After the setup and the implications of the buffer-stock model have 
been presented, the power of the buffer-stock model to solve 
empirical puzzles is investigated next. Carroll (1997, pp. 32-47) 
demonstrates how the buffer-stock model is able to explain different 
empirical puzzles. In his analysis, the benchmark of the buffer-stock 
model is the standard life-cycle model and a Keynesian model (C = 
a0 + a1Y + u). The most prominent empirical puzzle and its solution 
are introduced as follows:  
 
One result of the simulations of the buffer-stock model over 
different occupational groups is that income tracks consumption 
relatively closely up to an age of 45 or 50. In other words, if a target 
cash on hand to permanent income ratio exists, the growth rate of 
income and consumption must converge in aggregate (Carroll, 1992, 
p. 91). As outlined above, this corresponds to the stylized fact 
known as the income/consumption puzzle (Carroll & Summers, 
1991). Whereas the Keynesian model can explain this puzzle very 
easily assuming a0 to be close to zero and a1 to be close to one, the 
prediction of the standard life-cycle model is at odds with this 
empirical observation (see section 2.1). This result was enforced by 
other simulations of consumption models. For example, the models 
of Gourinchas & Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003) predicted the 
income/consumption parallel in the early life-cycle too.  
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Other empirical puzzles the buffer-stock model is able to explain 
like the consumption/ income divergence in high frequency data 
(pp. 38-42) and household age/wealth profile (pp. 42-47) are 
described in detail by Carroll (1997).  
2.3.3 Limitations of the buffer-stock model 
As indicated, the buffer-stock model is able to provide explanations 
for several empirical puzzles. But still there are empirical findings 
that the buffer-stock model is not able to explain. Some of these 
findings are mentioned, before the first article testing the main 
results of the buffer-stock model is briefly discussed. 
 
As described above, the buffer-stock behaviour developed by 
Carroll is a result of the tension between impatience, prudence, and 
the chance of zero earnings. However, the chance of zero earnings is 
not a plausible assumption in Germany because of the existing 
social welfare payments. This leads to serious problems for buffer-
stock behaviour in the model, since this behaviour relies on the 
strong preference caused by the utility function to prevent zero 
consumption resulting in savings in the previous periods. However, 
one can argue that instead of the prevention of zero consumption, 
the household wants to maintain a certain living standard above the 
living standard which can be guaranteed by social welfare 
payments. Further on, there seems to be evidence that buffer-stock 
behaviour is only engaged in by households up to 50 years of age 
(Carroll, 1997, pp. 3, 36; Carroll & Samwick, 1998, p. 414) or up to 
age 40 or 45 as estimated by Gourinchas & Parker (2002, p. 49). 
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Still puzzling is the behaviour of very wealthy households (Carroll, 
1997, p. 50). Their enormous financial assets are not consistent with 
the implications of the buffer-stock model. Furthermore, only 
financial assets are modelled in the buffer-stock model. Thus, the 
largest fraction of overall wealth, the housing wealth, (Carroll, 1997, 
p. 47) is not taken into consideration so far.   
 
Jappelli et al. (2006) were the first to test the implications of the 
buffer-stock model. The main prediction of the buffer-stock model 
is that households below their optimal wealth target should save and 
households above should dissave until the optimal wealth to income 
ratio is reached. To test this buffer-stock behaviour, the covariance 
between the gap of current and target wealth and consumption 
should be in the range between 0.4 and 0.7 (Jappelli et al., 2006, pp. 
8-11). The sample was restricted to households with a household 
head between the age of 20 and 50, since the hypothesis should be 
tested on the group where the buffer-stock behaviour is most likely 
to emerge. The data of the 2002 and 2004 Italian Survey on 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) were analysed. This data set 
provides a subjective measure of the amount of desired 
precautionary savings similar to SAVE. Since the optimal wealth 
stock is required for the analysis, they declared the desired amount 
of precautionary savings as the target wealth. Working with 
different kinds of robustness checks, the estimated covariances are 
far below the simulated range resulting from buffer-stock behaviour 
(Jappelli et al., 2006, pp. 14-21). Further on, they found that the 
wealth to income ratio of younger households increases with age, 
which provides indirect evidence against buffer-stock behaviour in 
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Italy (pp. 21-25, 40) since the buffer-stock model predicts a constant 
relation between wealth and income, at least for young individuals.  
2.3.4 Implications of the buffer-stock model 
From the discussion of the theoretical modelling of precautionary 
savings, several valuable hints were collected for the empirical 
modelling. Firstly, from a theoretical point of view model relevant 
parameters are identified. Carroll (1997, p. 19) investigated the 
degree of the influence of these parameters on the amount of buffer-
stock savings. He found that the degree of uncertainty 
(unemployment risk, transitory and permanent income shocks) and 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion have a strong influence, 
whereas permanent income growth, the interest rate, and the 
discount factor have a weaker influence on buffer-stock savings. 
These results are volatile with respect to different occupational and 
educational groups. For the empirical model developed in this study, 
measures of these variables are constructed, and control variables 
for different occupational and educational groups are added. 
Secondly, the variables like consumption or cash on hand were 
divided by permanent income to get a ratio of these two variables. 
Statements and implications of the buffer-stock model are provided 
related to these ratios. Thus, the subjective measure of precautionary 
savings in this analysis is related to permanent income as well. 
Thirdly, the theory emphasises the importance of permanent income 
compared to current income. An aim should be to construct an 
appropriate measure for permanent income, too. Fourthly, 
households seem to engage in buffer-stock behaviour only in the 
first half of the life-cycle. Therefore, it is controlled for different 
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ages of the household head, and other saving motives related to the 
precautionary motive are added. Fifthly, saving behaviour was 
found to be different for very wealthy households. Thus, adding 
wealth dummies helps to absorb different saving behaviours in 
different wealth groups. See section 5 for a detailed description of 
the included variables and the motivation behind these variables. 
But before this issue is addressed, a description of the SAVE dataset 
and descriptive statistics are provided in sections 3 and 4.
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3 The SAVE dataset 2005-2007 
3.1 The SAVE survey and its focus  
As emphasised by most researchers (Rodepeter, 1999, p. 119-120) 
and also in the conclusion of the “Household Saving” review of 
Browning & Lusardi (1996), the puzzling results of saving and 
consumption behaviour in general and of the precautionary saving 
motive especially makes more detailed, reliable, and extensive 
datasets necessary. According to Browning & Lusardi (1996, p. 
1849):  
“To assess whether behavior is consistent with the theory 
we need information on, for example, health status, 
subjective perceptions of mortality risk, and the situation of 
any children.“ 
The SAVE dataset introduced in 2001 tries to fill this gap for 
Germany. In addition to individual health status and life expectancy, 
a wide range of necessary questions are included to assess risks, 
uncertainties, and liquidity constraints. It is a hard task to get 
reliable measures of variables like the personal discount rate, risk 
aversion or prudence. Attempts have been done in SAVE, but these 
theoretical concepts are somehow difficult to elaborate. Taking 
aspects of behavioural economics also into account, variables of 
self-control and the ability of planning and calculation of future 
income, consumption or saving streams should also be included to 
set an extensive framework for a detailed analysis.  
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Since the question about the subjective measure of precautionary 
savings was first asked in 2005, this study takes the SAVE survey 
from 2005-2007 as the base for this analysis. Figure 5 shows the 
SAVE survey over the years with all its sub-samples. The years 
2005 to 2007 consists of two sub-samples. The Random Route 
sample is a multiple stratified multistage random sample, whereas 
the Access Panel is a quota sample (Schunk, 2006; Börsch-Supan et 
al., 2008). Even though the sample technique is different, 
comparisons of these two different sub-samples show that sample 
statistics of different variables are quite similar even if the Access 
Panel might cause a bias through non-randomness based on the 
latitude of judgement of the interviewer. To increase the available 
number of observations, both sub-samples are analysed.  
Figure 5: Sample design of SAVE 
Quota Sample
Random Route Sample Quota Sample
Access Panel
Access Panel
Random Route Sample
N= 357N= 1302 Refresher
Access Panel
Random Route Sample Access Panel
N= 1636 Refresher N= 333
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
N= 646
N= 487
N= 660N= 1169
N= 483N= 2184
N= 1505
Loss: 26%
Loss: 59%
Loss: 70%
Loss: 26%
Loss: 7%Loss: 23%
2007 Access Panel
N= 1598
Loss: 19%
Random Route Sample
N= 1333
Loss: 11%
 
Source: Börsch-Supan et al. (2008).
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3.2 The subjective measure of the desired amount of 
precautionary savings 
The question about the subjective amount of precautionary savings 
(hereinafter simply precautionary savings), on which this work is 
based, was introduced in the 2005 SAVE survey and was also 
requested in 2006 and 2007. The question printed in the German 
questionnaire is translated best in the following manner:  
“55. About how much do you think you and your family 
need to have in savings for unanticipated emergencies and 
other unexpected things that may come up?”4 
The first questionnaire to ask this question was the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) for the US in 1995.5 The aim of this 
question was to measure the desired amount of “buffer-stock“ 
savings, which is a stock figure (Kennickell & Lusardi, 2005, pp. 
10-11). For a better understanding of this question, it was placed 
after a sequence of questions concerning savings (this was done in 
the SCF as well as in the SAVE survey). In all three years the 
question before the precautionary savings question was to asses the 
importance of different saving motives (SAVE: question 54 in 
                                                     
4 In the German SAVE Study of 2005 this question was an exact translation 
of the corresponding question in the SCF. The question was phrased in 
German as follows: “Wie viel Ersparnis benötigen Sie und Ihre Familie 
zur Vorsorge vor unvorhergesehenen Ereignissen?” 
5 This question was also included in two other surveys: the “Italian Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth” from 2002 on and the "Dutch CentER 
Panel” in 2005. 
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2005). Before that question, the amount of household savings of the 
previous year was asked (SAVE: question 53 in 2005). Since 
question 53 asks for a flow figure, it is discussable whether or not 
the interviewees understood question 55 in the intended way. 
However, the amounts in the answers on precautionary savings 
suggest that most of the interviewees gave a stock figure as an 
answer (see table 6). In addition, the item non-response over all 
three years (table 1) shows that question 55 was somehow hard to 
answer.  
Table 1: Missing values of the question about precautionary savings 
year # obs missing values in %
2005 2298 504 21.9%
2006 3462 894 25.8%
2007 2924 757 25.9%
Source: SAVE 2005-2007.  
 
In contrast to the SCF95 with around 3%, the item non-response is 
fairly high at above 20% in SAVE. Since this question cannot be 
seen as a critical one which the respondent does not want to answer, 
this high item non-response could be the result of that a significant 
number of the interviewees did not understand the question or they 
had no idea what their precautionary savings should be. Thus, two 
typical advantages of subjective measures, the low cognitive burden 
and the low item non-response rate, are not the case here. Table 2 
shows different characteristics of household heads who answered 
the question and household heads who did not. The argument that 
the question is somehow hard to understand is confirmed in this 
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table, since missing rates are higher for older household heads, 
household heads with a basic education, and low income 
households. A t-test of the differences in the item non-response rates 
between each of these groups and the rest of the sample is 
significant at the 1% level. 
Table 2: Comparison of some sample characteristics between the answered 
and not answered questions about precautionary savings 
answered not answered
age
< 25 4.29% 7.15%
25 - 64 74.78% 62.65%
≥ 65 20.93% 30.21%
education
basic (9/10 years) 7.59% 15.97%
higher (13/14 years) 59.18% 60.22%
undergraduate (16/17 years) 15.98% 11.74%
graduate (18/19 years) 17.25% 12.06%
net monthly income
< €1300 21.38% 31.06%
€1300 - €2599 44.61% 44.54%
≥ €2600 34.01% 24.40%
# obs 6529 2155
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, average from 5 imputed datasets, unweighted, outlier excluded.  
 
Looking at the response behaviour over the years (table 3) gives a 
puzzling result. Instead of an expected learning process, there were 
even more respondents who answered the question the year before 
and had a missing value one year later than the other way around. 
One typical disadvantage of subjective measures is that the 
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respondents give answers which are socially desirable (Schunk, 
2007b, p. 4). This however should play a minor role, since there is 
no socially desired attitude towards precautionary savings. Maybe 
there is a tendency that higher precautionary savings are deemed 
better. 
Table 3: Response behaviour over the years 
answered missing value not participated total
answered 1,227 268 306 1,801
missing value 197 146 161 504
not participated 1,156 480 0 1,636
total 2,580 894 467 3,941
answered missing value not participated total
answered 1,859 334 387 2,580
missing value 315 423 156 894
not participated 0 0 467 467
total 2,174 757 1010 3,941
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, unweighted.
2006
2005
2007
2006
 
 
It is important to note that the question asked for the “desired” 
amount of precautionary savings. Thus, the level of precautionary 
savings which were reported should be unaffected by economic 
cycles the household has to face.  
 
Based on the fact that deleting interviewees who did not answer the 
questions included in the analysis may lead to a selection bias, the 
unanswered questions are imputed using the structure of the dataset 
and the information given by the person him-/herself and 
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interviewees who answered the question of concern and their 
characteristics. In my opinion, it is debatable to impute values of 
precautionary savings to households who did not understand the 
concept behind this question. However, it seems to be the best 
method to handle this problem. The imputation procedure and its 
results are described in more detail in the next section.
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3.3 Role of imputation 
The SAVE dataset was imputed every year from 2003 onwards 
using a “Markov Chain Monte Carlo multiple imputation 
procedure” to fill the missing values with plausible substitutes. For a 
detailed description of the whole procedure and the implementation 
see Schunk’s paper about this topic in 2008. This procedure has two 
important advantages: first, as already mentioned, the missing value 
of a variable might not be random resulting in biased estimates. 
Second, if an observed-case analysis is done, this can lead to a 
serious loss of efficiency due to the sometimes drastically reduced 
sample sizes.  
 
To allow that the relationships between the observed variables are 
estimated first, and estimates of these relationships are used to 
predict the missing values, the missing data must fulfil the 
“ignorable” criteria (Caneron & Trivedi, 2005, pp. 925-927). For 
that, two assumptions have to hold: first, the MAR (missing at 
random) assumption makes sure that the probability of a missing 
value does not depend on the missing value itself after controlling 
for the other observed variables, which are correlated to the missing 
value; second, the parameters for the missing values must be 
unrelated to the parameters which a researcher wants estimate from 
the data. The MAR assumption is normally not testable, whereas the 
second assumption is satisfied in the most cases. Therefore, the 
imputation procedure should include all relevant variables to 
estimate the missing values and to conserve the correlation structure 
of the dataset.  
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Variables with low missing rates (mainly socio-demographic 
variables) are imputed first. Then other variables are imputed 
making use of the additional information of the already imputed 
variables. After all gaps are filled, the procedure is repeated for most 
of the variables to impute these variables with as much information 
as possible, because now all variables can be included in the 
analysis based on the fact that there are no missing values left. This 
part is related to the “Markov Chain Monte Carlo imputation“ in the 
name of the imputation procedure above. The procedure is repeated 
five times to fulfil convergence criteria. After five loops, the 
procedure stops and one complete dataset is obtained. The overall 
procedure is repeated five times generating five datasets with 
different imputed values. This refers to the “Multiple” in the name 
above. From these five datasets the coefficients and standard errors 
are calculated according to Rubin’s rules (Rubin, 1996, pp. 467, 
477; Schunk, 2007a, pp. 37-38). Whereas the new coefficient is the 
average over the coefficients of the 5 datasets, the new standard 
errors take not only the within-imputation variance into account but 
also the between-imputation variance between the 5 imputed 
datasets. For more details related to this topic, the interested reader 
is referred to Rubin & Schenker (1986), Rubin (1987, 1996) and 
Little & Rubin (2002) amongst others. In this study, means and 
medians of the descriptive statistics are calculated over all five 
datasets.  
 
The most important question of this analysis, the question about the 
desired amount of precautionary savings, has amongst others the 
highest missing rates (see table A.2 for the missing rates of the 
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variables included in this analysis). From this point of view a proper 
understanding of the result of every imputation step is necessary. To 
make clear why different imputation procedures were chosen 
between 2005 and 2006/2007, table 4 is shown first.  
Table 4: Zero precautionary savings over the years 
year # obs # zero obs in %
2005 1794 168 9.4%
2006 2568 0 0.0%
2007 2167 0 0.0%
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, only observed values, unweighted.  
 
Whereas in 2005, 9.4% of all respondents gave a zero value, the 
answers for 2006 and 2007 were always positive. This was the 
reason to add a probit in 2005. The imputation procedure for each 
year is summarised as follows (table 5): 
Table 5: Imputation procedure of precautionary savings 
2005 2006 2007
               step 1
probit - -
step 2
regression of positive values regression of all values regression with trimming (+/- 1.96 standard
deviations around the mean, in this case values
above €180,000 are excluded for the estimation
of the coefficients)
adding a random variable adding a random variable adding a random variable
shooting shooting shooting
rounding off to hundred rounding off to hundred rounding off to hundred  
 
The procedure is described as follows for continuous or quasi-
continuous variables (Schunk, 2007a, pp. 13-15). After a probit 
(only in 2005) and a linear regression, the conditional expected 
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values are estimated and a random variable is added to the estimated 
values. This added random variable is a normal distributed random 
variable with a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to 
the root mean squared error of the regression before. The added 
random variable is censored to the maximum or minimum of +/- one 
standard deviation. It should ensure the variability of the imputed 
data. Since the regression and the added random variable provides 
estimates that are out of range of the observed values, the shooting 
process ensures that all values are between the minimum and 
maximum of the observed data by adding an always newly 
generated random variable with the appropriate sign, constructed in 
the same way as described above, to the imputed and out of range 
value (a negative random variable is added if the predicted value is 
below the minimum of the observed values, and a positive random 
variable is added if the predicted value is above the maximum of the 
observed values). This procedure ceases if the value is located in the 
observed range. 
 
This method of adding a random variable and shooting is also done 
by the imputation of other datasets like the Spanish Survey of 
Household Finances (EFF) (Barceló, 2006, pp. 24-25) and the SCF 
(Kennickell, 1998). However, this alone is no argument for the 
validity of this method.  
Schunk (2007a, pp. 25-32) compares descriptive statistics of the 
median and the mean of the observed and the five imputed datasets 
in 2003/2004. The complete SAVE dataset, which obtains the 
observed and the imputed data, shows a consistent pattern for 
financial and saving variables. He found that the mean of the 
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observed data is notably smaller than for the imputed values. 
Schunk refers to the imputation results of Hoynes et al. (1998), who 
arrived at similar results. However it may be wrong to conclude that 
“for most financial asset items, the included conditioning variables 
shift the distribution to higher values for financial wealth on average 
…” (Schunk, 2007a, p. 28) is also valid for the amount of 
precautionary savings. The following thoughts and data evidence 
related to the amount of desired precautionary savings make this 
point clear. Table 6 illustrates the situation and compares descriptive 
statistics of the observed and the imputed data: 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the observed data and the 5 imputed 
implicates 
obs. data imp. data 1 imp. data 2 imp. data 3 imp. data 4 imp. data 5
2005
# obs 1801 504 504 504 504 504
mean 10655 52094 53729 53255 51503 51018
median 3000 44200 45900 50200 48250 43650
std. err. 88802 39434 39674 37944 37408 40145
min 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 3000000 241900 228100 224000 176100 211900
2006
# obs 2580 894 894 894 894 894
mean 13673 36852 34852 35324 34951 35274
median 5000 34050 31200 32750 32700 31800
std. err. 56746 23371 24167 22648 22798 23450
min 5 300 0 200 0 0
max 1000000 128600 115000 106000 99600 136000
2007
# obs 2174 757 757 757 757 757
mean 13989 12987 12758 12502 12792 12685
median 5000 11400 10900 10800 11400 10900
std. err. 85380 8962 8989 9072 8862 9233
min 1 0 0 100 0 100
max 3000000 55200 56600 54000 60500 56700
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, unweighted, no correction for outlier.  
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Table 6 displays that the mean of precautionary savings is five times 
higher for the imputed than for the observed values in 2005 and 
around three times higher in 2006. In 2007 the means are relatively 
equal. The results may imply that the inclusion of the outlier in 2005 
and 2006 increased the mean and the median drastically. This 
conclusion is overhasty as the subsequent investigation shows.  
 
For this investigation, the imputation procedure has been followed 
step by step in all three years.6 After the regression and the probit 
(only in 2005), the means of the imputed data are relatively close to 
the observed means. However, the regression leads to negative 
estimated values (2005: 30%; 2006: 12%; 2007: 6%). The added 
error term flattens the estimated distribution for the unobserved 
values. As a consequence, the amount of negative and the mean of 
the positive values strongly increase, whereas the overall mean 
remains roughly constant. The positive values are kept and many 
trials are needed to make the negative values positive by adding 
additional error terms according to the shooting process described 
above. Thus, adding the error term and the subsequent shooting 
process are responsible for this substantial increase in the mean of 
the imputed values. The value finally imputed often differs 
remarkably from the value originally estimated by the first 
regression.7 
                                                     
6 Tables with distributions and summarised statistics can be requested from 
the author. 
7 A similar pattern is observed for the question about the annual savings the 
year before. Other imputed variables have to be inspected first. 
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Excluding outliers in 2007 reverses the positive effects on the mean 
of the imputed data. The problems of the imputation procedure itself 
remain. In conclusion, the drawbacks in the imputation procedure 
and its changes over the years make it necessary to rely only on the 
observed values of precautionary savings. Therefore, the household 
who did not answer the question about their precautionary savings 
are excluded in the subsequent analysis. 
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3.4 Inflation, outlier, and weights 
The euro amounts are not inflation adjusted in this analysis. The 
gain of an inflation correction is very limited in this case, and the 
additional assumption that, e.g., the inflation is equal over different 
groups categorised by region, consumption behaviour, or assets is 
very strong. Besides, the correction for inflation should not change 
any estimated empirical evidence below. 
 
The handling of outliers is always critical for the estimation results. 
If they are not corrected properly, this can result in a serious bias of 
the estimated coefficients. Since the subjective measure of 
precautionary savings is the explained and most critical variable in 
this analysis, using the logarithm as functional form of the explained 
variable may reduce the problem of outliers. Nevertheless, if the 
amount of precautionary savings was higher than €200,000 (42 
values ≈ 0.64% of the restricted sample 2005-2007), the values were 
compared over the years for the same household making use of the 
panel structure. After looking at the panel structure, a correction was 
made if a decimal place mistake occurred (8 values corrected). 
Observations were kept if a decimal place mistake could not be 
assumed and precautionary savings in the one year was not more 
than ten times larger than in another year (6 values kept). If the 
household only participated in one year, observations were deleted 
only if the values were more than €300,000 (2 values deleted). All 
the other observations above €200,000 were deleted. To sum up, 
correcting for outliers is always a process including a certain degree 
3 The SAVE dataset 2005-2007 
 44 
of arbitrariness. However, the procedure chosen should ensure that 
this arbitrariness is kept to a minimum.  
 
The exclusion of the missing values of the question about 
precautionary savings leads not only to a painful reduction of the 
number of observations but also to a strong decrease in the fraction 
of households participating in all three years. Further on, the 
exclusion of missing values properly leads to the selection bias 
described at the beginning of section 3.3. In spite of these serious 
disadvantages, the exclusion seems more appropriate, since the bias 
caused by the implemented imputation procedure seems to be higher 
than the bias caused by the limitation on the observed values of 
precautionary savings. After the correction of outliers and the 
limitation to observed values of precautionary savings (hereinafter 
called restricted sample), the following panel structure is obtained 
(table 7). 
Table 7: Panel structure 
panel structure all values (after outlier correction) restricted sample
 05 / 06 / 07 # obs in % acc. in % # obs in % acc. in %
  X    X    X 1619 41.1% 41.1% 934 27.9% 27.9%
  0    X    X 1297 32.9% 911 27.2%
  X    X    0 205 5.2% 281 8.4%
  X    0    X 5 0.1% 121 3.6%
  X    0    0 469 11.9% 458 13.7%
  0    X    0 341 8.7% 442 13.2%
  0    0    X 3 0.1% 201 6.0%
3939 100% 100% 3348 100.0% 100%
Source: SAVE 2005-2007.
38.3%
20.6%
39.2%
32.9%
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Weighting is a useful operation to eliminate survey bias due to over 
or under-sampling of certain parts of the population. In the next 
section the descriptive statistics of the restricted sample are 
calculated using weights based on the Mikrozensus 2004 for the 
SAVE dataset of 2005, on the Mikrozensus 2005 for the SAVE 
dataset of 2006, and Mikrozensus 2006 for the SAVE dataset of 
2007. The Mikrozensus is a yearly repeated statistical survey by the 
German Federal Statistical Office which covers around 1% of all 
households in Germany. The households are chosen in a way that 
they are a representative mapping for the German population. 
 
Nine different categories of households are constructed from the 
restricted sample. They differ in three different net income classes 
(below €1300, €1300 to €2599, €2600 and above) and three age 
classes (under 35 years of age, 35 to 54, 55 and above). To calculate 
the weights the relative frequency of households in the Mikrozensus 
is divided by the relative frequency of households in the restricted 
SAVE sample, both part of the same category of households. 
Despite the fact that the restrictive sample is used, the weights 
calculated for each year are in a reasonable range (not smaller than 
0.55 and not greater than 2.19). Thus, the post stratification weights 
make sure that the restricted sample is a representative image of the 
population in the dimensions the weights were calculated. Whereas 
the necessity of weights is established for descriptive statistics, 
weights are not unquestioned for the regression based inference. 
Radbill & Winship (1994, pp. 242-247) demonstrated that 
unweighted OLS should be preferred over weighted OLS if the 
weights are only a function of the explanatory variables as it is the 
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case here. If the model is correctly specified, both weighted and 
unweighted OLS will produce unbiased and consistent estimates. 
Unweighted OLS yields smaller standard errors and is therefore 
more efficient. As a result, weights are used in the descriptive 
analysis. The regression based inference is done without weights. 
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4 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section descriptive statistics are introduced. The focus is on 
bivariate analyses of the relationship between precautionary savings 
and explanatory variables, which are found to be important from an 
empirical and theoretical point of view. The number of descriptive 
statistics has to be limited, and only some of the most relevant 
figures are displayed. Before starting with the bivariate analysis, the 
subjective measure of precautionary savings itself is graphically 
analysed. Figure 6 plots the kernel-density-function for each year 
from 2005 to 2007. 
Figure 6: Kernel-density-function of precautionary savings 
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A concentration of observations in the area between €0 and €5,000 
inclusively is noticed, whereas the most observations were 
concentrated between $5,000 and $10,000 in the article of 
Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 12). Around 67% of all answers are 
in this range over the whole time period. The amount of the desired 
precautionary savings is concentrated around the so-called focal 
points, e.g., €1,000 with 12.6%, €2,000 with 10%, €5,000 with 
17.6%, and €10,000 with 14.8% over the complete time period. The 
following table shows the mean, median, and standard deviation 
over the years for the restricted sample: 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of precautionary savings 
year # obs mean median std. err. min max
2005 1794 6194 3000 14684 0 500000
2006 2568 9330 5000 19400 5 300000
2007 2167 8834 3500 24528 1 1000000
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted.  
 
Whereas the H0 hypothesis of similarity of the yearly distributions is 
rejected for 2005/2006, 2005/2007, and 2006/2007 using a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of distributions 
based on the weighted restricted sample, H0 cannot be rejected for 
2006/2007 with a p-value of p=0.621 for the unweighted restricted 
sample. However, as pointed out above, weights are a useful tool to 
get a representative sample at least for the two chosen 
characteristics of income and age. Therefore, weights are used for 
the ongoing descriptive analysis. 
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One issue, which has always been of great interest from a macro 
perspective, is the question about the contribution of precautionary 
savings to wealth accumulation. The traditional way to get an 
answer in micro-empirical studies is to calculate the difference 
between the observed wealth, which includes automatically 
precautionary savings, and a predicted measure of wealth without 
precautionary savings. The first step is to regress total or financial 
wealth on several households’ characteristics plus some risk 
measures. Setting the variables of risk to zero or to their minimal 
observed values and holding all the other characteristics of the 
household constant, wealth is predicted using the estimated 
coefficients (e.g. Carroll & Samwick, 1998, pp. 416-417; Bartzsch, 
2006, pp. 13-15). In a second step, the sum of the differences 
between the observed wealth and the predicted wealth over all 
households in the sample is taken and divided by the sum of 
observed wealth over all households: the obtained quotient is 
assumed to be the average fraction of wealth which is due to 
precautionary savings. This is the procedure chosen mainly to get 
the estimates of precautionary savings described in section 1.2. This 
calculation method has several drawbacks, e.g. the risk measures 
could be only poor proxies of the real risks the household is facing 
or they may not capture the whole range of risks the households 
might want to cover with their precautionary savings.  
 
A completely different way to estimate the contribution of 
precautionary savings to wealth accumulation is to use a subjective 
measure of precautionary savings. A first possibility consists in 
calculating the mean over the whole sample of both precautionary 
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savings and a measure of wealth and dividing the first one by the 
second one. A second method is to calculate the ratio of the 
subjective measure of precautionary savings to different measures of 
wealth for each respondent, taking the median afterwards. The mean 
is not a useful measure in this case, because of negative values for 
total wealth and a high fraction of zero financial wealth. Table 9 
summarises the results:8 
Table 9: Contribution of precautionary savings to different measures of 
wealth 
2005 2006 2007 2005-2007 1995, 1998 2002, 2004
mean precuationary savings 6194 9330 8834 8298 20855 55137
mean total net wealth 141053 148380 141486 144079
mean financial wealth 31648 32117 31081 31645
∑ precuationary savings/ ∑ total net wealth 4.4% 6.3% 6.2% 5.8% 8%
∑ precautionary savings/ ∑ financial wealth 19.6% 29.1% 28.4% 26.2% 20%
median ratio of 
precuationary savings/ total net wealth 4.0% 5.7% 5.4% 5.0% 31%
precautionary savings/ financial wealth 30.6% 45.5% 38.5% 38.5% 332%
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, average over 5 imputed datasets, weighted.
¹Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, pp. 1, 14, 16): the mean in USD is calculated out of the information of three subsamples.
²Jappelli et al. (2006, p. 12): the sample was restricted to household heads aged between 20 and 50.
Jappelli et al.²Kennickel & Lusardi¹SAVE
 
 
The results are compared to the results in two other articles working 
with a subjective measure of precautionary savings: Kennickell & 
Lusardi working with the SCF of 1995 and 1998 and Jappelli et al. 
working with the SHIW of 2002 and 2004. The results of the SHIW 
differ remarkably from the SCF, although the question in the SHIW 
is similar to the question in the SCF. In contrast, the results of the 
                                                     
8 The definitions of the wealth categories correspond to the definitions 
chosen in Börsch-Supan et al. (2008). 
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SAVE study are much more in line with the SCF. In the 2005-2007 
SAVE survey precautionary savings account for 5.8% of total net 
wealth and 26.2% of financial wealth (1st calculation method). It is 
not clear how the ratios reported in the article of Kennickell & 
Lusardi (2005, p. 16) are calculated. The author assumes that the 
calculation was done using the first method, whereas Jappelli et al. 
(2006, p. 12) interpreted the ratio to be calculated after the second 
method. 
 
But how does the size of precautionary savings develop over 
different age classes? In the case of this study, one has to keep in 
mind that figures 7-9 are the result of both age and cohort effects, 
which cannot be separated using such a short panel.  
Figure 7: Mean of precautionary savings over age classes (2005-2007) 
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Figure 7 shows that on average precautionary savings increase up to 
approximately 60 years of age and thereafter remain on a high level. 
Setting precautionary savings in relationship to monthly net income 
and financial wealth alters the picture. Whereas the stock of 
precautionary savings is more than four times higher than monthly 
net income for households below 25 years of age, the ratio decreases 
to about twice times the monthly net income of households between 
30 and 34 years of age, and increases up to 6 times the monthly net 
income for households between age 60 and 64 (figure 8; the median 
ratio of precautionary savings to monthly net income displays a u-
pattern too). 
Figure 8: Ratio between the mean of precautionary savings and the mean 
of monthly net income over age classes (2005-2007) 
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Compared to financial assets, the fraction of precautionary savings 
is above 70% for households below 25 years of age and quickly 
decreases to a level of around 20% between 30 and 54, before it 
slightly increases again to above 30% (figure 9; the median ratio of 
precautionary savings to financial wealth results in a similar 
pattern). This u-pattern can also be found for the median ratio of 
precautionary savings to total net wealth. Thus, precautionary 
savings seems to be by far more important for young and old 
households.  
Figure 9: Ratio between the mean of precautionary savings and the mean 
of financial wealth over age classes (2005-2007) 
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Figure 10 shows the mean of precautionary savings over different 
educational groups. The groups are constructed from the length of 
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educational and professional training (see table A.1 in the 
appendix). As can be seen, there is a positive relationship between 
the length of education and the mean of precautionary savings. The 
figure plotting the median precautionary savings over the length of 
education leads to the same result (not shown here). 
Figure 10: Mean of precautionary savings over the length of education 
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Controlling for self-selection into different occupations is important 
for this investigation, as the self-selection process may be driven by 
different risk attitudes, which influence the precautionary savings 
too. Section 5.2.4 gives deeper insights. Figure 11 presents the mean 
and the median precautionary savings over different occupations. 
Since civil servants face the lowest income risk, one could expect 
civil servants to have the lowest mean or median precautionary 
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saving. That self-selection into different occupations comes into 
play here, can be seen in figure 11. 
Figure 11: Mean and median of precautionary savings over different 
occupations (2005-2007) 
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There the civil-servants have a similar median amount of 
precautionary savings than the self-employed and freelancers. Using 
a mean comparison t-test, the H0 hypothesis of equal means between 
the self-employed workers and freelancers, farmers, family 
members employed in the family business, and individuals who are 
currently not in paid employment cannot be rejected in each case. 
Additional controls like a measure of risk aversion may help to 
obtain the partial effect of being self-employed. The multivariate 
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analysis in the following sections will exploit the possibility to 
control for a wide range of variables.  
 
As Carroll (1997, p. 19) points out, risk aversion together with the 
degree of uncertainty is the most influential determinant of buffer-
stock savings: the higher the risk aversion, the higher the buffer-
stuck savings, holding all other explanatory variables constant. The 
critical point in micro-empirical studies is to find an appropriate 
measure for risk aversion. Börsch-Supan & Essig (2002, pp. 87-91) 
constructed a measure of risk aversion out of the average of five 
questions about the willingness to take risks with respect to the 
respondent’s own health, career, money, leisure time and sport, and 
driving.  
Figure 12: Median of precautionary savings over different measures of risk 
aversion (2005-2007) 
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Figure 12 pictures the median precautionary savings over each of 
the five categories and the newly constructed average measure of 
risk aversion (using the mean leads to a similar pattern). Opposite to 
the expectations, there is no substantial increase in precautionary 
savings with a higher degree of risk aversion. This is the case for all 
6 measures. Börsch-Supan & Essig (2002, pp. 88-90) presented a 
similar puzzling result. In the SAVE study of 2001, there is an 
increase in the saving rate for households who are less risk averse. 
Other questions concerning the risk attitude such as placing a whole 
day’s income on a bet (question 123 in 2005) were not asked again 
in 2007. Also, the financial decision questions (questions 104-107 in 
2005) were only asked in 2005. Since there is not a better measure 
available for the risk attitude, the average over the five categories is 
used in the multivariate analysis.  
 
Another important control variable is the regular support by other 
households.9 Support from other households is similar to an 
insurance. If a household gets into financial distress, the financial 
support from another household can step in and help out. In all three 
years the mean of precautionary savings of households not receiving 
                                                     
9 Question 73 (in 2005) regarding irregular support of more than €25 per 
month from persons in another household together with question 71 (in 
2005) regarding regular support would have been the preferred variable, 
since financial distress is for most households a transitory situation and 
only irregular support is needed. However, there was a mistake in 2005. 
Only households who answered that they received support on a regular 
basis were also asked to answer the question about receiving support on 
an irregular basis. This was not the case in 2006 and 2007. 
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regular financial support is higher than the mean of precautionary 
savings of households receiving regular support (figure 13). 
However, the only year in which this result is statistically significant 
is 2006. This result holds for the median of precautionary savings as 
well (not shown here). Thus, regular financial support from other 
households may tend to decrease households’ precautionary savings. 
Other insurance variables are not explicitly discussed here. They are 
included in the multivariate analysis.  
Figure 13: Mean of precautionary savings over regular financial support 
from other households 
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Hurst & Kennickell & Lusardi (2005) investigated the differences in 
saving behaviour of individuals who were business owners and 
those who were not. They concluded that one has to properly 
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account for the differences in the saving behaviour between business 
owners and non-business owners to take different environments they 
face and characteristics they have into account. Figure 14 plots the 
mean of precautionary savings over business ownership. In all three 
years, the possession of business wealth is connected to higher 
precautionary savings. The pattern is the same for an inspection of 
the median of precautionary savings over business wealth. 
Figure 14: Mean of precautionary savings over business wealth (yes/no) 
0
5,
00
0
10
,0
00
15
,0
00
20
,0
00
m
ea
n
no ye
s
business wealth
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, average over 5 imputed datasets, weighted.
Mean of precautionary savings
over business wealth (yes/no)
2005 2006 2007
 
 
4 Descriptive Statistics 
 60 
The final issue addressed in this section is a measure of income 
uncertainty. This variable is gained from the following question 
(questionnaire of 2005): 
76. During the last five years, did your income … 
□ fluctuate significantly; □ fluctuate slightly; □ not fluctuate at all? 
Figure 15: Mean of precautionary savings over income fluctuations 
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Figure 15 shows the mean precautionary savings over households 
categorised according to their income fluctuations during the last 
five years. The prediction of the theory is that increasing income 
fluctuations involve a rise in precautionary savings. In contrast to 
that, figure 15 and the equivalent graph presenting the mean of 
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precautionary savings suggest that there is no such relationship in a 
bivariate analysis. 
 
To summarise the results of the bivariate analysis, it was found that 
especially very young (below 25 years) and elderly households 
(from age 55 to 60 onwards) hold more precautionary savings 
relative to their monthly net income or to their financial wealth. In 
addition, a positive relationship between the length of education and 
precautionary savings was discovered. Wage earners and salaried 
employees have the lowest mean and median, freelancers and self-
employed are amongst the highest. Moreover, risk aversion has no 
influence on the amount of precautionary savings. Regular financial 
support from other households reduces as expected the amount of 
precautionary savings and business owners have substantially more 
precautionary wealth. In contrast to the theory, there is no 
relationship between the amount of precautionary saving and 
income fluctuations over the past five years. Since the results seen 
in the bivariate analysis might be driven by variables we had not 
controlled for, it is time to turn to the multivariate empirical 
analysis, which is discussed in detail in the following three sections. 
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5 Development of an empirical equation for 
the SAVE dataset 
5.1 Reduced form regression equation 
Almost all micro-empirical studies investigating the precautionary 
saving motive10 are based on the estimation of the following 
equation: 
I. )X,f(risk
Y
W
hhP
h
h =  or II. )X,Y,f(risk)g(W hPhhh = , 
where Wh is a measure of wealth held by household h, PhY is the 
permanent income, riskh is a vector of measures of different kinds of 
risks, and Xh is a vector of control variables (e.g., age, gender, 
education, occupation). This wealth to permanent income equation 
is based on the life-cycle models introduced above. An implication 
of these models is the estimation of the ratio of a measure of wealth 
to permanent income (equation I.).  
 
To allow for non-homothetic preferences, the functional form of the 
logarithm makes it possible to add the log of permanent income on 
                                                     
10 For instance, Guiso et al. (1992, p. 324), Starr-McCluer (1996, pp. 289-
290), Kazarosian (1997, p. 242), Lusardi (1997, p. 323; 1998, p. 449), 
Carroll & Samwick (1998, p. 413), Engen & Gruber (2001, p. 560), 
Arrondel (2002, p. 188), Murata (2003, pp. 5, 10), Hurst & Kennickell & 
Lusardi (2005, p. 6), Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 3), Bartzsch (2006, 
p. 4). 
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the right hand side (equation II.). Now the influence of explanatory 
variables on the ratio of precautionary savings to permanent income 
must not be constant, and the influence is allowed changing with 
increasing permanent income. This is done in the subsequent 
multivariate analysis.  
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5.2 Problems related to the empirical assessment of 
the precautionary saving motive  
The estimation of such an equation is a difficult task. Several 
problems are related to the empirical estimation of the precautionary 
saving motive. Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, pp. 4-9) give a good 
overview. In the next subsections several issues are explained, and 
the implementation using the SAVE dataset is presented. Since not 
all variables are discussed in detail, table A.1 in the appendix 
contains the definition of every variable used in this analysis of the 
SAVE dataset and table A.2 provides information about the item 
non-response. 
5.2.1 The explained variable 
Total net wealth or financial wealth were mainly used as explained 
variables in micro-empirical studies so far (see table A.3 in the 
appendix). However, it is difficult to define a measure of wealth that 
satisfies the needs of precautionary savings. The time required for 
accessibility of money plays a major role and depends on the risks 
and uncertainties a household has to face. Whereas longevity risk 
has a very long time-frame, a broken car or washing machine must 
be replaced more quickly. Even though financial wealth is more 
liquid than housing wealth, real estate can serve as a security for 
credit. Thus, considering only financial wealth may be defined too 
narrowly and taking total net wealth may be defined too widely. 
Therefore, liquidable wealth has been introduced, but it is difficult 
to draw the line (Kennickell & Lusardi, 2005, p. 16). Further on, 
different measures of wealth are the results of a wide range of 
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saving motives. Thus, different motivations and related backgrounds 
are mixed in these measures. The desired amount of precautionary 
savings offers another possibility as an explained variable and partly 
circumvents the problems of commonly used wealth variables. Since 
this measure has only been used in the article of Kennickell & 
Lusardi (2005) as the dependent variable, the knowledge about the 
validity of this measure is still very limited. This study may help to 
shed more light on this issue. 
5.2.2 Income risk and other risks over the life-cycle 
Using the precautionary saving motive in empirical work, leads to 
many difficulties. The most notable difficulty is to find measures of 
risk and uncertainty that are correlated with precautionary savings 
and vary strongly enough across the population (Lusardi, 1998, p.1).  
Income risks 
For a long time, the focus has been exclusively on income risk 
defined as earnings plus transfers risk excluding non-capital income 
in most cases. It was implicitly assumed that income risk is the most 
important risk an individual has to face. Estimating the variance of 
income, which was the method chosen by Carroll & Samwick 
(1998) and Kazarosian (1997) using panel data, is one possibility. 
   
Skinner (1988) used occupation dummies as a proxy for income 
risk. His results revealed that in contrast to the theory individuals 
with occupations related to riskier income flows saved less than 
people in other occupational groups. This points in the direction of 
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self-selection into jobs according to the individual’s risk aversion. 
Thus, the results state that occupation dummies are normally not a 
good proxy for income risk but they are necessary controls. Another 
way to approach this problem is to construct a subjective measure of 
income uncertainty as Guiso et al. (1992) and Lusardi (1997) did 
using the 1989 SHIW. Their measure was based on a question about 
the change of expected nominal earnings of a household one year 
after the household was examined (Guiso, 1992, pp. 311-317). The 
variance derived cannot be seen as a measure of earning variance 
over a whole life-time since it is the forecast for only one period in 
the future. In addition, the low variance which was constructed can 
be the result of the labour market in Italy having only a low 
percentage in short-term contracts (Lusardi, 1997, p. 322).  
Nevertheless, both Guiso et al. and Lusardi found a small but 
significant influence of the subjective measure of income risk.  
 
As pointed out by many authors (e.g., Carroll, 1992; Engen & 
Gruber, 2001), unemployment is likely to be one of the main 
sources of uncertainty about future income. Lusardi (1998, p. 451) 
used a subjective measure based on an individual’s evaluation of the 
probability of becoming unemployed in the next year. Another 
measure of unemployment risk are regional unemployment rates 
(Lusardi, 1997, pp. 323-325; Kennickell & Lusardi, 2005, p. 18; 
Essig, 2005, pp. 17, 31). This exogenous source of income variation 
can reflect the general, not individual specific probability of 
becoming unemployed. Along with an increase in both measures, 
precautionary savings should increase to buffer against a higher 
general or individual unemployment risk.  
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To sum up, it is of utmost importance to find appropriate measures 
of risk. The drawback of the constructed measures of risk out of 
panel data might be that it could be a difficult task to eliminate 
measurement error to obtain the “real” transitory and permanent 
income for the variance calculation (Kennickell & Lusardi, 2005, p. 
5). Aggregated risk measures constructed from time series lose the 
individual information which is so important in this case (Guiso et 
al., 1992, p. 308). Further on, the household could already be 
insured against this risk (Caballero, 1991, pp. 862-863; Browning & 
Lusardi, 1996, pp. 1803, 1821), which is investigated in a further 
subsection. Since the interviewee might better know the kinds and 
magnitudes of risk he or she has to face, subjective measures of risk 
or a subjective question about the amount of precautionary savings 
are the better method of collecting these data. But misreporting due 
to misunderstanding or desirability of a certain answer may lead as 
well to a bias (Schunk, 2006, p. 4; Essig, 2005, p. 7; Alessie & 
Kapteyn, 2001).  
 
Three different measures of income risk are applied in this study to 
meet the concerns of the outlined difficulties: one individual specific 
backward looking, one individual specific forward looking, and a 
general measure of income risk.  
 
The individual specific backward looking measure is constructed 
from the question already presented at the end of section 4 (question 
76 in the SAVE survey of 2005). Two dummies are constructed 
using no income fluctuation as the base group. The intuition behind 
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this question is that households having significant fluctuations over 
the past five years should have higher precautionary savings than 
the other two groups on average. Those households with no 
fluctuations at all should have the lowest precautionary savings, 
holding other factors constant.  
 
The forward looking measure of income risk is the measure already 
used by Lusardi (1998, p. 451) or Essig (2005, pp. 15-17). In the 
SAVE questionnaire the respondent was asked to rate the likelihood 
of job loss in the year of the survey for the household head (pH) and 
his/her partner (pP). The range is from 0% (very unlikely) to 100% 
(very likely). Under the assumption that the replacement rate is 
a=60% for all households11 and the knowledge about the individual 
specific income of the household head (YH) and the partner (YP), the 
income variance is calculated from the formula  pH(1-pH)(1-a)²YH + 
dP pP(1-pP)(1-a)²YP, where dp is a dummy of having a partner. The 
likelihood of becoming unemployed of the household head and the 
partner is assumed to be independent, and pH or pP are set to zero for 
civil servants or individuals who are not working, which includes 
both unemployed and retired individuals. The included measure, 
which is the calculated standard deviation of income divided by 
                                                     
11 The earned rate is 67% if there is a child in the sense of § 32 paragraph 
1, 3 to 5 Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG). Since the age of children and 
their status are not known in SAVE, this distinction cannot be made. 
Moreover, the claim for unemployment money and the duration of 
availability depends on the age of the individual and the kind, length, and 
times worked in the past. For more information, the homepage of the 
“Bundesagentur für Arbeit” is a helpful guide. 
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current income, is the variation coefficient of income in the near 
future.  
The last measure of income risk are the unemployment rates in the 
16 federal states to cover the general unemployment risk in the 
federal state the respondent is living (Essig, 2005, pp. 17, 31).12 
Health risk 
As Börsch-Supan (2005) describes, there are additional risks 
influencing individuals over the life-cycle. Many of them influence 
the current and the future path of the ability to consume in one way 
or another. The risks he mentioned stretch from economic and 
political risks to biometric and family risks. From this broad range 
health risks are considered next. Health risks are critical from two 
perspectives. On the one side a poor health can influence the labour 
income, on the other side it may raise medical expenses and reduce 
expenses in other categories in the future. Moreover, it can already 
influence the consumption behaviour today through large 
investments in health today (Picone et al., 1998). This means that a 
higher risk in a drastically worsening health situation should lead to 
higher precautionary savings today. Guiso et al. (1996, pp. 163-168) 
used the number of ill days as a proxy for health uncertainty. 
Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 19, appendix) included the state-
specific level of out-of-pocket health costs and a more individual 
specific measure on expected health care expenses in the next 5 to 
                                                     
12 Information are taken from the homepage of the “Statistische Ämter des 
Bundes und der Länder”. The unemployment rates for each federal state 
are the average unemployment rates for each year. 
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10 years, but only the expected future health care expenses were 
significant and had the expected sign. Kong & Lee & Lee (2007) 
calculated the variance in the health status using a four year panel of 
Korean data. This measure had the correct sign and was significant 
for a sample restricted to household heads over 64 years of age. 
Instead of reducing precautionary savings, households covered by a 
private health insurance had higher levels of wealth than uninsured 
households (Starr-McCluer, 1996). Thus, private health care 
insurance coverage must be strongly endogenous, since it mirrors a 
common attitude towards risk. 
 
In this study, health risk is constructed from a question asking for 
the expectation about the future development of the own and the 
partner’s health situation. The dummy constructed is equal to one if 
the health development is expected to be poor for at least one 
household member (household head or the partner) (see table A.1 in 
the appendix). This poor expected health development should 
induce higher precautionary savings today.  
Longevity risk 
The risk that life expectancy is underestimated by individuals and 
that resources actually needed are higher than the individual 
originally accounted for is called longevity risk. Precise 
measurements of longevity risk are hard to quantify. Medical 
progress and its impact on life expectancies is difficult to measure. 
Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, pp. 19-20) included a proxy for this 
risk using the variation coefficient of longevity (a similar procedure 
was chosen by Palumbo (1999, p. 406)). For that procedure, life 
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expectancy was calculated for each person based on mortality 
probabilities categorised by age, gender, and race. From the 
distribution of life expectancy the standard deviation was derived. 
The ratio between this standard deviation and the difference 
between life expectancy and current age was their variable for 
longevity risk. This procedure does not pay any attention to the 
information each individual has about his/her living and health 
condition (Hurd & McGarry, 2002, p. 966).  
 
The SAVE study uses this information asking each individual to 
estimate his/ her own and his/ her partner’s life expectancy. Smith & 
Taylor & Sloan (2001) as well as Hurd & McGarry (1995, 2002) 
elaborated that individuals are quite good at their subjective 
evaluation of their own longevity and their survival probabilities 
respectively. Consequently, these variables can be useful tools in 
micro-empirical equations of life-cycle models. As Börsch-Supan & 
Essig (2005, pp. 7-8) presented, individuals tended to underestimate 
their life expectancy in the SAVE study of 2004. The reason is that 
individuals are misled since they have already survived certain risks 
up to their present age, and they take life expectancy of newborns as 
their own. Since these mistakes are made and it is not possible to 
identify “right” and “wrong” estimates, it is a difficult task to 
construct an appropriate measure of longevity risk.  
 
For this study only a measure of the expected years left to live 
(maximum of the household head and his/her partner) is included in 
the analysis. A plausible hypothesis seems to be that if longer years 
5 Development of an empirical equation for the SAVE dataset 
 72 
left to live are correlated, e.g., with an increasing health risk, an 
increase in this variable should result in an increase in precautionary 
savings. Lusardi (1998, p. 452) included a variable which measured 
the subjective probability of living to age 75 with a similar 
intention.  
Business risk 
Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 20) constructed the failure rate of 
businesses categorised by type, age, and state of business and 
included this measure as a proxy of business risk. In this study, only 
a dummy for the possession of business assets is included to control 
for the different behaviour of business owners. In examining the 
different behaviour of business owners and non-business owners, 
Hurst & Kennickell & Lusardi (2005) found that after splitting the 
sample into these categories, the contribution of precautionary 
savings to total net wealth accumulation dropped from around 50% 
to less than 10% for non-business owners and to less than 12% for 
business owners. The results support the findings of a low or 
moderate contribution of precautionary savings to wealth 
accumulation and points out the importance of controlling for 
business owners, which was explicitly or implicitly done by all the 
studies finding a low or moderate contribution of precautionary 
savings. Compared to the pooled SCF of 1995 and 1998 with 11%, 
business owners account for only 4.7% in the restricted SAVE 
sample from 2005-2007 (average over all five imputed datasets).  
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Pension risk 
Many people are uncertain about the level of their future public 
pension (Murata, 2003). This uncertainty should lead to a higher 
private old-age provision via higher precautionary savings. 
Therefore, a dummy is added, which is one if at least for one, the 
household head or the partner, there is no guess possible about the 
expected level of the public pension. This variable is not available 
for the year 2005.  
 
Finally, the connection between the buffer-stock model and the 
empirical equation introduced in section 5.1 is made by Carroll & 
Samwick (1998, pp. 412-413). They present an almost linear 
relationship between the optimal cash on hand to permanent income 
ratio and the measures of income uncertainty. Similar to Bartzsch 
(2006, p. 4) it is assumed that a linear relationship exists for the 
uncertainty and risk measures used in this study if no dummy 
variable is used. 
5.2.3 Estimation of permanent income 
Following the argumentation of the permanent income hypothesis, 
households should consume out of permanent income and not out of 
current income. The purpose of precautionary savings is to smooth 
consumption around permanent income to maintain the living 
standard in the face of risk and uncertainty. Considering this aspect, 
precautionary savings should be set into relation to permanent 
income (Engen & Gruber, 2001, p. 561).  
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Permanent income normally is a variable constructed from panel 
data as done by many authors (Kazarosian, 1997, p. 242; Fuchs-
Schündeln & Schündeln, 2005, p. 1098; Bartzsch, 2006, pp. 5, 9). 
There are three reasons why constructing permanent income out of 
panel data does not seem to be a passable way using the SAVE 
dataset: first, the panel analysed consists of only three observations 
over time; second, the time distance between each observation in 
time is only one year; thus we have only two years between the first 
and the third observations in time; third, observations over all three 
years can only be obtained for less than 50% of all households. If 
sufficient panel data are not available, Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, 
p. 17) use a subjective measure of permanent income, which asks 
for the “normal” income of households. A similar question is not 
available in the SAVE dataset. This leads to the method of 
constructing permanent income out of a cross section developed by 
King & Dicks-Mireaux in 1982 (pp. 254-257) and applied by many 
authors, e.g., Starr-McCluer (1996, pp. 292-294), Murata (2003, pp. 
21-24), and Essig (2005, pp. 8-10). Subsequently, this method is 
described in more detail, followed by criticism and the introduction 
of the method applied in this study.  
 
Permanent income of individual i is denoted by piy  and depends on 
a vector of observable characteristics Xi (gender, education, 
occupation, …) with a coefficient vector β, unobservable 
characteristics si (ability, motivation, early family upbringing), and a 
correction term for different cohorts c(agei), since younger cohorts 
normally are better off due to capital accumulation and technical 
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advancements. This can be expressed in the following functional 
equation: ( )
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Plugging equation I in equation II and making additional 
assumptions, the next equation is obtained:  
2
u
2
sitititiit
ititit
ititi
c
it
σσ) var(η0,)E(η and usη and               
 )c(age)ageh(age)g(age      where          
η)g(ageβX)f(y III.
+==+=
−−=
++=
Now permanent income can be estimated in different ways. The 
easiest way is that permanent income is equal to the age-adjusted 
earnings profile iXβˆ  of the individual i ignoring the individual’s 
specific effect si and the cohort effect c(agei) (see equation I; chosen 
by Carroll & Dynan & Krane (1999, pp. 18-19); Arrondel (2002, p. 
191)). A more complex way is to take these two effects into 
account:  
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There are some critical assumptions in the whole procedure, which 
are not outlined in this study, but by far the most important and also 
most critical one is the estimation of the individual specific 
component si. This part is further developed. At first, si has to be 
estimated. Neglecting this term can lead to a serious bias in the 
estimation of the coefficients β. Since si is a fraction of the total 
error term ηit in equation III, this fraction can normally be estimated 
using panel data. Given that only a cross section is available, 
estimates from other panel studies have to be used. The estimate of  
αˆ  implemented in the studies of King & Dicks-Mireaux (1982, p. 
255), Starr-McCluer (1996, p. 294), and Essig (2005, pp. 8-9) is 0.5 
based on the studies of Lillard & Willis (1978, p. 991) and Lillard 
(1977, p. 45). Since these studies were written more than 30 years 
ago and rely on US data, to assume that αˆ =0.5 seems inappropriate 
for actual German data. Moreover, the size of αˆ  depends crucially 
on explanatory variables already included in Xi. Even more 
important is that for each individual the time constant unobservable 
effect is treated as being half of the difference between observed and 
imputed current income. This treatment makes things easier than 
they really are.  
 
These concerns brought up another method to deal with this issue. 
The log of current income along with other income specific control 
variables is included at the right hand side (see the equation on page 
88). Controls are the level of employment (e.g., full-time, part-time, 
low level, not employed), number of income sources, probability of 
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receiving a high inheritance, and a dummy for retirement and past 
unemployment. Accounting for past unemployment is necessary 
since this often lowers the permanent income and the stock of 
wealth (Arrondel, 2002, p. 189). Additional to these controls, the 
controls included also for precautionary savings can hold income 
relevant variables constant. Age, gender, marital status, foreigner, 
education, and occupational group are some examples (see table A.1 
for more details). Since panel techniques are applied to estimate the 
coefficients, it can be controlled for time invariant unobservable 
variables, which was the main concern above. With this method it is 
not possible to obtain an estimate of the coefficient of permanent 
income. However, it is possible to hold constant all the variables 
that may influence permanent income. This may allow estimating 
the other coefficients properly. 
5.2.4 Necessary controls and other theoretically important 
variables  
Even though from a theoretical point of view, the interest focuses 
mainly on the different measurements of risk, control variables play 
an important role in achieving unbiased estimates of the 
coefficients. If there is a correlation between an explanatory variable 
and an omitted variable, which has an influence on the explained 
variable, the result will be an upward or downward bias of the 
coefficient of interest depending on the sign of the covariance of the 
omitted variable and the explanatory variable and the coefficient of 
the omitted variable. Control variables are added to the equation 
since several risk variables and the explained variable seem to be 
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correlated with other variables. However, not only the consistent 
estimation of the coefficients of risk variables should be achieved, 
but also the effects of additional variables which are important as 
outlined in the theoretical discussion earlier are qualified and 
quantified. For a detailed list and how the variables are constructed, 
the reader is referred to table A.1 in the appendix. Most common are 
controls for age, gender, education, and marital status.13 
Household composition 
A dummy of whether the household has children or not and a 
dummy of whether an additional person except for the partner and 
the children lives in the household’s home is added. It is not 
possible to specifically identify the additional person(s). The 
intention behind the inclusion of this dummy is that additional 
persons living in the household’s home who are not the children of 
the household head or the partner are mainly older people, maybe 
the parents, who have to be cared for in many cases. This home care 
may not only be time but also money extensive, since medicine and 
outpatient care is needed. The parents being cared for often have 
their own income sources. However, if savings and pension 
payments of the parents are not enough, their children have to pay 
depending on their income and wealth. Thus, precautionary savings 
should increase in the presence of additional person(s) in the 
household. The effect of children in the household is not clear. On 
                                                     
13 Different specifications for age were implemented and the p-values from 
the F-tests of the age terms were compared. The lowest p-value was 
obtained form age alone. However, the coefficient was still insignificant. 
Thus, only age is included in the specifications. 
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the one side children can raise additional needs for precautionary 
saving, on the other side children may limit the possibility to do so. 
However, the last point made should be irrelevant since it was asked 
for the “desired” amount of precautionary savings.  
Occupation dummies 
Moreover, occupation dummies are included since not controlling 
for self-selection leads to a serious underestimation of precautionary 
savings as Lusardi already stated in 1997 (p. 320). Fuchs-Schündeln 
& Schündeln (2005) confirmed the results of Skinner (1988) using 
the German reunification as a natural experiment. Making use of the 
German civil servants in the German SOEP and the fact that most of 
the civil servants in Eastern Germany did not select their jobs in 
consideration of income risk, since income risk in the German 
Democratic Republic was not a matter of concern, they identified 
the importance of self-selection into different jobs and quantified the 
effect of self-selection on precautionary savings.   
Foreigner dummy 
The article of Piracha & Zhu (2007) emphasised the importance of 
the distinction between natives and immigrants. They used a change 
in the German nationality law in 2000 as a natural experiment to 
determinate the change in the saving behaviour of immigrants. Since 
the new nationality law reduced uncertainty for immigrants, they 
found a reduction of precautionary savings for immigrants of around 
13% after the law came into effect. Thus, a dummy representing a 
foreigner is included to partly control for a different saving 
behaviour of natives and immigrants. Since foreigners face 
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additional risks (e.g. more difficulties to become employed) 
compared to natives, it is expected that being a foreigner has a 
positive influence on precautionary savings.  
Expectation about income growth 
According to the buffer-stock model, expectations about future 
income growth are included. If the expectation of future income 
growth drops, the result should be a rise in the optimal wealth to 
income target (Carroll, 1997, pp. 13-15). Two measures are 
available; that is, a variable asking for the expectations about the 
future development of the own financial situation for the longer time 
horizon as well as a variable reflecting the likelihood of an income 
increase one year in the future both ranging from 0 (very negative/ 
unlikely) to 10 (very positive/ likely).  
Impatience  
The importance of a measure of impatience was pointed out at the 
end of section 2. To get a measure of the time preference, a dummy 
for the smoking status is included. The idea behind this proxy is that 
smokers evaluate the current utility of smoking higher than negative 
influences on their future health status. Recently Khwaja & Sloan & 
Salm (2006, pp. 674-676) confirmed the positive relationship 
between the degree of impatience and being a smoker. Moreover, 
they found that smokers have a higher risk tolerance than non-
smokers (pp. 676-678). Further on, smoking status seems to be a 
time-invariant characteristic of the individual (pp. 674, 678). Thus, 
an individual who smoked in the past should have the same 
preference structure. It is the opinion of the author that this must not 
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be the case, because the alteration of an individual’s smoking 
behaviour might result from a change in the preference structure. In 
this study the better fit is obtained using a dummy equal to one if the 
individual is a current smoker ignoring smoking behaviour in the 
past. This dummy of the smoking status is used as a proxy for 
impatience and risk tolerance in this paper. In the context of 
precautionary savings, smoking behaviour as a proxy for impatience 
was already used by Lusardi (2003, p. 12) and Kennickell & Lusardi 
(2005, p. 20).  
 
Besides that, a dummy variable is added to control for the time 
preference from another perspective. The underlying question asked 
the respondents to place themselves on a scale from 0 (I am easy 
going and take each day as it comes. I don’t think or worry much 
about the future) to 10 (I think about the future a lot and have a 
pretty good idea of where I want to be and want to do in the future). 
The dummy is equal to 1 if the respondent answered a value lower 
than 5 (easy going type) and the base group corresponds to 
individuals who think a lot about the future.  
Other preferences  
The attitude towards risk is not only important for self-selection into 
different jobs. If risk aversion is also positively correlated with 
prudence, which is the case for the CRRA utility function, higher 
risk aversion leads to higher precautionary savings. The constructed 
variable used as a measure of risk aversion was already introduced 
in detail in section 4. 
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SAVE offers a wide range of variables which may reflect general 
attitudes towards saving. A dummy variable is constructed out of the 
question asking for whether or not households hold a certain 
minimum amount in their current account. Since the current account 
is besides cash and credit cards the most liquid money, to limit 
spending not to fall below this minimum amount should reflect a 
precautionary attitude towards risk and should therefore raise 
precautionary savings on average. Moreover, a dummy is included 
for whether or not the household is not a regular saver type.  
Health 
As current health status has an influence on future precautionary 
savings based on a relation to future health problems and the 
perception of expected health expenditures (Arrondel, 2002, p. 189), 
controls are included for current health status.  
Liquidity constraints 
Liquidity constraints influence the ability of households to get credit 
when in financial distress. If households in financial distress want to 
prevent consumption from falling below a minimum amount, 
precautionary savings are necessary. Conversely, households who 
can borrow need not as much wealth to protect them against a drop 
in current income. But it is difficult to construct an appropriate 
measure of the household’s possibilities to borrow. Kennickell & 
Lusardi (2005, p. 21) summarise some of the established measures 
in other studies. Different variations in constructing a liquidity index 
have been tried in this study. The result is a dummy variable being 
one if a credit was refused, not granted in the full amount, or if the 
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household did not apply for credit because they thought that the 
credit would not be granted. The time horizon for these questions is 
the last five years. Moreover, the overdraft limit is included. A 
higher limit should reduce the necessary precautionary savings at 
least in the short run. Other and additional investigated possibilities 
are a dummy for low income families (e.g. monthly income lower 
than €900 (€1200), which corresponds to the 10th (20th) percentile) 
and the ratio of outstanding debt over total net wealth.  
Insurance 
Precautionary savings are a buffer against risks the household is not 
insured against. The private and public insurance market therefore 
plays a major role in the magnitude of precautionary savings. The 
German social insurance system is one of the most fully developed 
social security systems in the world dating back to the years 1883, 
1884, 1889, and 1912 during the German Empire and the year 1927 
during Weimar Republic. The mainly obligatory unemployment, 
health, accident, old-age, and long-term care insurance system in 
addition to social benefits are well developed compared to other 
countries like the US. This strong insurance system may reduce the 
influence of certain long-term and short-term life-cycle risks 
mentioned above. The past years brought strong changes about the 
social security system, and it started a still ongoing process towards 
increasing self-responsibility. The so-called “Hartz IV Law”, the 
pension and health care reforms are only some of the ever returning 
vocabulary in the last few years. Whether this process is observable 
in the data in changing buffer-stock savings is an interesting 
question, since the uncertainty about the social security system is 
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raised in the general awareness, and the objective economic risk in 
the transitional period could be higher (Börsch-Supan, 2005, p. 1). 
However, the private insurance market could have taken over, which 
is only observable in a limited way in the SAVE dataset. Social 
insurance coverage is compulsory for the largest portion of the 
German population (for the exemptions see the Sozialgesetzbuch 
[SGB]). Nevertheless, not every individual who is not subject to the 
compulsory insurance coverage holds a voluntary insurance. 
Distinctions and nuances cannot be identified with SAVE in 2005 
and 2006. In 2007 respondents had to indicate whether their 
employment relationship underlies the compulsory social insurance 
coverage. The questions about the ownership of a private or social 
long-term care insurance plan were only asked in 2007. 
 
For all three years two dummies for private insurance coverage 
(occupational disability and liability insurance) are included. In the 
case of private occupational disability insurance as well as private 
liability insurance, precautionary savings should decrease. As 
introduced and discussed already in section 4, regular support from 
other households is included too.  
Interaction between different motives to save  
As Hurst & Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 7), Kennickell & 
Lusardi (2005, pp. 8-9), or (Jeppelli et al., 2006, p. 22) point out, 
wealth accumulated for bequest purposes and the old-age provision 
can be used additionally to the precautionary savings as buffer-stock 
savings if unforeseen events occur and more money is needed than 
saved for unforeseen events. If the precautionary savings are 
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enough, then savings for bequests and old-age provision can serve 
their original purpose. To control for these two saving motives, two 
variables for the importance of the bequest motive and the 
importance of the old-age provision motive are included ranging 
from 0 (unimportant) to 10 (very important).  
Wealth dummies 
In empirical studies it is often emphasised that the saving behaviour 
of wealthy households is different than the saving behaviour of less 
wealthy households (see section 2.3.4). In the case of rich 
households, wealth accumulation has to serve additional purposes 
and cannot be explained alone to finance own future consumption or 
the consumption of heirs. Carroll (2000) investigates alternative 
models. He clarified that wealth itself can cause utility whether 
through power or social status. Therefore, four wealth dummies 
corresponding to the quartiles of the total net wealth distribution are 
constructed to control for other purposes that savings can serve.  
Other specifications 
Specifications with a wide range of other variables and different 
functional forms have been accomplished.14 The variables included 
                                                     
14 Some of the additional variables investigated are: interactions of all risk 
variables with different age groups; interactions between age and 
educational groups; interaction between educational and occupational 
groups; social welfare payments; past smoker; household size; number of 
children; dummies for one, two, …, more than five children; income 
variance out of expected unemployment probabilities with and without 
replacement rate; unemployment probabilities; dummy for low income 
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in the final version are selected, first, to meet the theoretical 
requirements and, second, to incorporate previous empirical 
findings. If more variables in SAVE seemed to be promising, the 
specification showing the best fit was chosen. The adjusted R², the 
Akaike Information Criterion, and the Schwarz Information 
Criterion served as a reference point (Gujarati, 2003, pp. 536-538). 
Further, including additional variables allows for the checking of the 
robustness of the applied specification. 
5.2.5 Functional form 
Using the logarithm of the desired amount of precautionary savings 
or wealth is a typical approach in estimating higher amounts of 
monetary units because of the skewed distribution. The logarithm 
normally leads to less serious effects of outliers as mentioned above 
and reduces the problem of heteroskedasticity. In addition, robust 
standard errors are used in all estimated equations.  
 
Using the log of precautionary savings makes it necessary to 
exclude zero precautionary savings. Only in 2005 168 households 
with zero precautionary savings were observed (see table 4). Hence, 
a selection model like the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 
1976) seems unnecessary in this case (at least not for 2006 and 
2007). Since the exclusion of observations at the left tail side may 
                                                                                                               
families; a ratio of outstanding debt over total net wealth; permanent or 
temporary working position; change in the income situation during the 
last five years; save goal; optimism; self-assurance; record keeping; other 
variables out of the health category. 
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lead to a bias, another procedure is implemented. A small and 
positive amount (plus €1) is added to ensure that all values of 
precautionary savings are bigger than zero. Thus, this leads to a 
small and negligible right shift in the distributions of precautionary 
savings. 
  
As described at the beginning of this section, using the logarithm 
allows adding the variable for permanent income (in this study 
current income) on the right-hand side to permit non-homothetic 
preferences. 
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5.3 The basic empirical equation for SAVE 
After considering all the points made above, this leads to the 
following empirical equation, which is estimated separately for 
every year:  
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where the form of the equation was described in sections 5.1 and 
5.2.5, the dependent variable was introduced in section 5.2.1, the 
permanent income challenge was clarified in section 5.2.3, the risk 
variables were presented in section 5.2.2, and the control variables 
were discussed in section 5.2.4. Since 5 imputed datasets exist for 
every year (in this study every dataset is restricted as outlined 
above), the normal procedure is to run the regression on every 
dataset and compare the results to analyse the variation between the 
datasets (Caneron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 934). After that Rubin’s rules 
are applied to combine the estimates out of all five imputed datasets 
(see section 3.3). Table 10 shows the results of the regression of 
each year using Rubin’s rules. Since the results of these regressions 
do not lead to stable results over the years for most of the 
explanatory variables, only the coefficients and standard errors of 
the risk variables are shown here justified in the importance of the 
risk variables. The specification is the same over all years except for 
theoretically important variables which are only available in 2006 or 
2007. These variables are added in the regression of 2006 and 2007. 
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Table 10: Robust OLS estimation for each year from 2005-2007 
log(precautionary_savings+€1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
std(net income)/net income -0,008 0,749 0,240 0,346 0,505 0,386
significant earnings fluctuations 0,125 0,170 0,068 0,078 -0,016 0,080
slight earnings fluctuations 0,130 0,145 0,072 0,062 -0,088 0,068
provincial unemployment rate -0,004 0,029 -0,019 0,013 -0,012 0,015
expected years left to live -0,017 ** 0,008 -0,004 0,003 -0,009 ** 0,004
poor development of hh health 0,072 0,195 0,082 0,084 0,021 0,092
uncertain pension -0,092 0,062 -0,166 ** 0,069
# obs 1794 2568 2167
average R-sq 0,224 0,266 0,282
Note: * : 10% significance level; ** : 5% significance level; *** : 1% significance level.
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, unweighted, application of Rubin's rules.
Comments:
The control variables used are the same as in the RE and FE estimations in section 7. 
The variable pension uncertainty of a household is only available in 2006 and 2007.
In 2007 the following controls have additionally entered the regression: obligation to contribute
to social insurance system; private long-term care insurance; additional long-term care insurance.
For a detailed description of the variables see table A.1 in the appendix.
2005 2006 2007
 
 
There is strong evidence for heterogeneity among the three years. A 
first hint for the heterogeneity is the changing evidence of the 
impact of explanatory variables over the years. To formally test the 
heterogeneity between the years, a pooled regression for the years 
2005 and 2006 was run. An additional time dummy was included 
and all variables were interacted with a time dummy for 2005 and 
one for 2006. The time intercept for 2006 and the interaction terms 
for 2006 were found to be jointly significant from zero at a 1% 
significance level using a Wald test. The same was found for the 
2006/2007 and the 2005/2007 combinations. The insignificance of 
the risk variables and the strong heterogeneity make more 
convenient empirical procedures necessary. Thus, to control for 
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endogeneity is one major concern. In connection with these more 
appropriate empirical procedures a detailed discussion of the results 
is done. Methods, applications, and results are discussed in section 6 
and 7. 
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6 Estimation technique 
6.1 Pooled cross sections and macro shocks 
Since the variables of interest, mainly the risk variables, are not 
significant analysing each cross section separately (table 10), which 
could be based on the insufficient sample size of each cross-section, 
one way to increase the sample size is to use independently pooled 
cross sections. This can be done by using the cross sections in 
SAVE from 2005-2007. The observations might not be identically 
distributed over time since the effects of independent variables may 
change. Further on, as Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 7) 
emphasised, macro shocks can change the distribution of variables 
in different years. For example, a household with higher 
unemployment risk is more likely to be hit by a shock and a 
resulting reduction of wealth during a recession. Possible solutions 
are different intercepts for each year and different slope coefficients 
for variables, which are expected to change (Wooldridge, 2003, pp. 
408-413).  
 
To deliver consistent and efficient estimates, the same assumptions 
apply compared to a normal OLS-estimation. This means that 
correlation in the error term under the assumption of independently 
sampled observations is ruled out. But this can only be true having 
no panel data, because in panel data the error term of a household is 
normally serially correlated over the years. In SAVE, there is a non 
negligible panel component (see table 7). 
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To sum up, one advantage is that pooling the cross sections of 2005-
2007 raises the observations and therefore the efficiency of our 
estimates. The drawback is the serial correlation of the error term 
for the most part of the total sample, which is based on the panel 
structure. Moreover, endogeneity may cause biased inference. This 
issue is addressed next.  
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6.2 Endogeneity problems 
When explanatory variables are correlated with the error term in a 
regression, the researcher has to deal with the challenge of 
endogeneity. One possible way for endogeneity to occur is 
whenever the direction of causality of explanatory variables is 
ambiguous. On the one side, wealth or home equity can be the result 
of precautionary savings. On the other side, the precautionary 
savings behaviour itself can be strongly influenced by the level of 
wealth and home equity as explained above. To circumvent this 
challenge, the following estimations are done twice for robustness 
reasons: one time with possible endogenous variables, the other time 
without. Estimating the equation without possible endogenous 
variables might induce an omitted variable bias if the eliminated 
variables are correlated with other regressors. The following 
variables have been ex ante identified as two-way causality 
variables: wealth dummies and a dummy for home equity. This 
procedure was also chosen by Kennickell & Lusardi (2005, p. 20) 
and Schunk (2007b, p. 12).  
 
Endogeneity can also occur for two other reasons: first, 
measurement error in the regressor(s) and, second, omitted variable 
bias. In these cases instruments can be a useful tool as used in the 
studies of Carroll & Samwick (1998, p. 414) and Lusardi (1997, pp. 
323-325). However, to find valid instrument variables (IV) is 
normally a hard task because they should fulfil three properties 
(Wooldridge, 2003, pp. 461-500): First, the instruments must be 
exogenous; second, the instruments have to be correlated with the 
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endogenous variable; third, the instruments are not allowed being 
explanatory variables for the explained variable, which is often 
subsumed under property one. Poor instruments are easily obtained 
if the instruments and the endogenous variable are weakly 
correlated. The problem with poor instruments is not just that the 
variance of the IV estimator is much larger than the variance of the 
OLS estimator. A more serious problem is that the IV estimator can 
have a larger asymptotic bias even if the instrument and the error 
term are only modestly correlated.  
 
The difficulty in finding appropriate instruments and the drawbacks 
of poor instruments resulted in the method to control for 
endogeneity applied in this study. This method makes use of the 
panel structure and applies the random effects (RE) and fixed effects 
(FE) model to control for time-constant omitted variables. But there 
is no possibility to control for time-varying omitted variables that 
are correlated with the dependent variable as instruments can do. 
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6.3 Panel estimation techniques 
This section reviews the panel estimation techniques applied in this 
study (Wooldrige, 2002, pp. 248-291). The topic is motivated, the 
mechanics introduced, and the most essential assumptions are 
discussed.  
 
y and x ≡ (x1, x2, …., xk) are observable random variables and s is 
an unobservable or omitted random variable, often called 
unobserved effect. s can stand for unobserved variables like early 
family upbringing, skills, and motivation. s is assumed to be time 
constant. h=1, …, N denotes the household and t=1, …, T is the 
actual time period. Supposing a linear model gives the following 
relationship: 
 (1) yit = β0 + xitβ + si + uit 
where β is the K·1 vector of interest and uit is the idiosyncratic error 
or idiosyncratic disturbance. As already mentioned in section 5.2.4, 
omitting a relevant variable, in this case the individual time constant 
error s, can lead to biased estimates if s has an influence on yit and 
cov(xjt, si) ≠ 0 for some j. In this procedure, si is treated as a random 
variable as is normally the case in the modern view. The mechanics 
introduced here are for a balanced panel, which means that for each 
time period the same number of not changing households are 
available. In an unbalanced panel this is not the case. However, the 
mechanics are similar to the balanced case but not explicitly 
discussed in this study. The statements are made with a focus on the 
asymptotic properties, where N grows to infinity and T is fixed.  
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The first assumption discussed is the strict exogeneity assumption, 
which the explanatory variables have to fulfil for both the RE and 
the FE model. The interpretation of this assumption is that after xit 
and si is controlled for, xit has no partial influence on yik for all k ≠ t. 
Stated in the form of the idiosyncratic error, gives 
(2) E(uit/ xi1, …, xiT, si)=0 for all t=1, 2, ..., T.  
This assumption implies that cov(uit, si)=0 and that 
(3) E( itikux′ )=0 for t,k=1, 2, …, T.  
Assumption (3) is much stronger than the so called zero 
contemporaneous assumption, which is E( ititux′ )=0 for t=1, 2, …, 
T. However, assumption (3) allows that cov(xit, si) ≠ 0. The last 
statement is important since it leads to the modern distinction 
between RE and FE models. One assumption the RE model has also 
to include is that cov(xit, si) must be equal to zero. This does not 
have to be the case for the FE model.  
 
The FE model uses relationship (4):  
(4) )u(u)βx(xyy iitFEiitiit −+−=−  
Since it uses only the variation of a variable over time for each 
individual, the FE estimator is called the within estimator. Under the 
assumption of strict exogeneity and the rank condition, the FE 
model is unbiased and consistent. It is more robust than the RE 
model since the additional assumption E( iitsx′ )=0 is not necessary. 
A serious drawback is that only time varying explanatory variables 
can be included in the analysis. The rank condition is not fulfilled 
for a time constant variables and therefore they have to be excluded.  
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The within estimator is also efficient, if T
2
uiititit Ισ)s,x|uE(u =′   
(where IT is the identity matrix), which means that the idiosyncratic 
errors uit are homoskedastic across t and are not serially correlated. 
If this is not the case, the estimator is not efficient and a robust 
variance matrix estimator should be used to calculate test statistics.  
 
The RE model takes advantage of the information in the correlation 
structure of the composite error term using a generalised least 
square (GLS) method. For the GLS estimation to be consistent, the 
usual rank condition for GLS must be assumed (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p. 258). It can be shown that the RE estimator is the weighted sum 
of the between and the fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge, 2002, 
pp. 286-288), resulting in the next equation:  
(5) )u(u)βx(xyy iitREiitiit ϑϑϑ −+−=−  
with 2
u
2
s
2
u
σσT
σ1 +⋅−=ϑ  
The estimation procedure is unbiased if E( iitsx′ )=0 for t=1, 2, …, T 
and efficient under the additional assumptions )s,x|uE(u iititit ′  
T
2
uΙσ=  and 2cit2i σ)x|E(s = . Without the last two assumptions, a 
robust variance matrix should be used (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 262-
263). For large N and a fixed T, the price for standard errors and test 
statistics that are robust to heteroksedasticity and serial dependence 
is negligible even if both last named assumptions hold.  
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One advantage of the RE model over the FE model is that if the 
assumption E( iitsx′ )=0 is fulfilled, the variances of the RE 
estimators have much smaller variances than the FE estimators, 
because more information contained in the error term structure are 
exploited. In addition, the FE model is not able to produce estimates 
for time constant variables and can only produce imprecise 
estimates for variables that do not have much variation over time 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 286).  
 
It could be that the model does not contain individual unobserved 
effects. This can be tested under H0: 0σ2s = , which is the statistical 
equivalent to the non-existent unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2002, 
pp. 264-265). The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
statistic for RE offers a way to test H0. If H0 is rejected, panel 
techniques should be applied.  
 
To test whether the RE or the FE model is appropriate, the 
E( iitsx′ )=0 must be proved (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 288-291). The 
Hausman test formulates the H0 and H1 hypothesis under the 
assumption of strict exogeneity. Under H0: E( iitsx′ )=0 both the RE 
and the FE model should produce consistent estimates. The 
difference between the estimated coefficients weighted with the 
variance covariance matrix of the estimates should be small. H1 
states that E( iitsx′ )≠0. In this case only the FE model is consistent, 
and the difference between the estimated coefficients should be 
large. If H0 is rejected, the FE model should be the preferred choice.  
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But what happens if the assumption of strict exogeneity fails? Then 
not only the Hausman test is inappropriate, but also the coefficients 
of the RE and FE models are not consistently estimated. To reject or 
not reject the strict exogeneity assumption, the following test is 
suggested (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 285). A regression based test for 
strict exogeneity is the estimation of the following expanded version 
of the FE model. 
 (6) yit = xitβ + wi,t+1δ + si + uit , t=1, 2, …, T-1 
where wi,t+1 contains variables of xit, which may violate the strict 
exogeneity assumption. One time period is lost through the 
inclusion of wi,t+1. The strict exogeneity assumption is rejected if 
deviations of δ from 0 are significant since this would violate 
assumption (2) or (3).   
7 Results 
 100
7 Results 
7.1 Application of RE and FE models  
After the theoretical discussion of the RE and the FE models, they 
are applied. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
statistic for RE supports this application. The H0 hypothesis of no 
random effects is rejected at a 1% significance level in all five 
datasets.  
Since both the RE and FE models are critically based on the 
assumption of strict exogeneity, the test for strict exogeneity should 
be implemented as suggested at the end of section 6. The 
unbalanced panel of this study, which stretches over only three time 
periods, may easily lead to significant elements of δ. This fact 
questions the explanatory power of two elements of δ which were 
found to be significant at a 10% level. It is the opinion of the author 
that the assumption of strict exogeneity cannot be properly tested 
under these circumstances.  
 
The further procedure begins with the estimation of the RE model. 
In most cases it is a good idea to include a separate time period 
intercept (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007, p. 1). This is done by 
including two dummy variables, one for 2005 and one for 2007. The 
reported intercept is the intercept for 2006 and must be corrected by 
the dummy coefficient for the corresponding year to obtain the 
intercept for 2005 or 2007. The RE model is the preferred model 
since it is more efficient if the outlined assumptions hold and allows 
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for the estimation of time-constant factors, which cannot be 
estimated using a FE model. To decide whether the additional 
assumption for the RE model holds, a FE model is estimated with 
the same coefficients and the Hausman test is applied next. The H0 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is rejected at a 1% significance level 
in all five datasets.15 Thus, the coefficients of the RE and the FE 
effect model are too different taking the standard errors into 
account. If this is the case, some researchers infer that a FE model 
must be preferred to a RE model.  
 
Instead of rejecting the RE model in favour of the fixed effect 
model, another procedure is chosen to guarantee that the assumption 
E( iitsx′ )=0 is fulfilled. This assumption is violated if missing 
covariates are correlated with observed covariates. Skrondal & 
Rabe-Hesketh (2004, pp. 52-53) and Berkhof & Snijders (2007, pp. 
142-147) suggest including the mean over time ix  for every 
individual and for each variable as additional covariates. These 
terms will absorb the bias of the coefficients if the assumption 
E( iitsx′ )=0 is violated. Thus, the RE model expanded by ix  as 
additional covariates combines the advantages of both RE and FE 
models. It produces consistent estimates and permits the inclusion of 
time constant variables as regressors. The results are shown in the 
last column of table 11. As can be seen very easily, the difference in 
the coefficients of the FE model and the expanded RE model has 
                                                     
15 The female dummy is dropped since gender does not change over time. 
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almost vanished. The H0 hypothesis of the Hausman test cannot be 
rejected with a p-value of 1.00 in all five datasets.  
 
However, the expanded RE model as well as the FE model can fail 
to estimate coefficients of variables accurately if they do not vary 
very much over time. Column 6 of table 11 shows the frequency of 
changes in each variable over time. Variables show less frequent 
changes for preference variables, marital status, educational and 
occupational status, for example. Moreover, the imputation 
procedure could be responsible for part of the variation of these 
variables. The applied imputation procedure makes no use of the 
panel structure, and the hotdeck procedure is mainly applied to the 
relative stable variables over time. The hotdeck imputation could 
have led to an increase in the changes of these variables.  
 
For robustness reasons, table 12 shows the results of other 
specifications using the RE model extended by the inclusion of ix  
as additional covariates such as: estimation without possible two-
way causality variables (specification 1.); exclusion of zero 
precautionary savings caused by not adding one to the amount of 
precautionary savings (specification 2.); restriction of the sample to 
a balanced panel to learn more about changing behaviour over time 
(specification 3.); restriction of the sample size to household heads 
not older than 50 years, since in this part of the life-cycle buffer-
stock behaviour is most likely to emerge (specification 4.); 
restriction of the sample to non-business owners, since, as 
mentioned in section 5.2.2, saving behaviour varies significantly 
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between business owners and non-business owners (specification 
5.); and changes of the covariates and their functional form as 
already mentioned at the end of section 5.2.4 (not shown). The 
construction of all variables and the base group of each dummy 
variable is outlined in table A.1 in the appendix.  
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Table 11: Random effects, fixed effects, and expanded random effects 
estimation 
RE FE changes expanded RE
log(precautionary_savings+1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. over time Coef. Std. Err.
log(net income+1) 0.171 *** 0.050 0.125 * 0.067 89.6% 0.124 ** 0.060
work full -0.167 * 0.097 -0.061 0.225 8.0% -0.059 0.178
work part 0.002 0.096 0.146 0.172 4.6% 0.147 0.141
work little 0.016 0.092 0.210 0.155 10.2% 0.210 * 0.125
# income sources 0.063 ** 0.028 0.019 0.046 48.0% 0.020 0.038
high heritage probability 0.258 ** 0.110 0.187 0.164 17.3% 0.187 0.143
unemployed -0.102 0.112 -0.009 0.182 8.1% -0.008 0.150
past unemployment 0.055 0.052 -0.005 0.125 9.9% -0.005 0.108
retired -0.134 0.096 -0.023 0.193 2.4% -0.017 0.162
std(net income)/net income 0.300 0.269 0.310 0.396 51.3% 0.309 0.327
significant earnings fluctuations 0.090 0.064 0.108 0.100 25.6% 0.109 0.084
slight earnings fluctuations 0.055 0.052 0.082 0.079 40.7% 0.081 0.066
provincial unemployment rate -0.020 0.013 -0.093 0.091 97.0% -0.092 0.075
expected years left to live -0.010 *** 0.003 -0.010 * 0.006 96.5% -0.010 ** 0.005
age 0.011 ** 0.004 0.013 0.028 100.0% 0.013 0.023
Eastern Germany 0.182 0.128 -0.042 0.346 0.3% -0.112 0.307
female -0.086 0.064 0.000 0.0% -0.114 * 0.067
foreigner -0.014 0.180 0.342 0.268 1.6% 0.342 0.225
single -0.090 0.084 -0.195 0.260 2.5% -0.196 0.220
separated or divorced -0.376 *** 0.094 -0.110 0.234 4.1% -0.111 0.193
widowed -0.358 *** 0.125 -0.233 0.307 0.9% -0.245 0.267
children in hh -0.095 0.060 0.121 0.152 7.9% 0.124 0.124
additional person in hh 0.172 * 0.096 0.155 0.163 5.7% 0.156 0.142
basic education -0.220 * 0.114 -0.071 0.237 3.6% -0.072 0.195
undergraduate education 0.187 *** 0.068 0.465 *** 0.157 8.2% 0.465 *** 0.127
graduate education 0.223 *** 0.085 0.291 0.206 5.9% 0.291 0.178
civil servant 0.080 0.107 0.184 0.309 0.8% 0.188 0.267
selfemployed or freelancer 0.156 0.105 -0.087 0.236 4.1% -0.086 0.188
good state of health -0.134 *** 0.052 -0.046 0.081 8.7% -0.047 0.068
poor state of health -0.129 0.092 -0.127 0.149 21.9% -0.127 0.123
poor development of hh health 0.068 0.067 -0.016 0.095 17.0% -0.015 0.081
future income situation 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.013 54.4% 0.005 0.011
develop. own economic sit. 0.025 ** 0.013 -0.004 0.022 77.1% -0.004 0.018
smoker -0.149 ** 0.062 -0.132 0.180 5.8% -0.131 0.147
easy going -0.188 ** 0.079 -0.028 0.121 15.1% -0.028 0.100
risk aversion 0.024 * 0.012 0.015 0.021 91.7% 0.015 0.018
no min. amount in cur. account -0.238 *** 0.050 -0.215 *** 0.077 29.8% -0.215 *** 0.064
no regular saver -0.199 *** 0.049 -0.097 0.079 26.9% -0.097 0.065
no liability insurance -0.216 *** 0.083 -0.082 0.136 11.7% -0.083 0.115
pr. occup. disability insurance -0.099 * 0.056 0.082 0.101 13.4% 0.082 0.083
regular support 0.138 0.090 0.097 0.153 8.1% 0.096 0.132
liquidity index -0.075 0.089 -0.053 0.159 10.1% -0.053 0.132
overdraft limit 0.027 *** 0.006 0.020 * 0.011 64.5% 0.020 ** 0.008
motive bequest 0.036 *** 0.008 0.030 ** 0.015 70.6% 0.030 ** 0.012
motive old-age 0.057 *** 0.010 0.027 * 0.014 76.7% 0.027 ** 0.012
business owner 0.208 * 0.110 0.139 0.252 3.8% 0.133 0.200
wealth_1 -0.321 *** 0.069 -0.047 0.108 16.3% -0.047 0.089
wealth_3 0.181 ** 0.077 -0.016 0.126 21.3% -0.014 0.106
wealth_4 0.364 *** 0.093 -0.058 0.161 13.5% -0.057 0.134
homeowner 0.042 0.076 -0.007 0.188 6.8% -0.007 0.154
d2005 -0.699 *** 0.052 -0.582 *** 0.074 -0.582 *** 0.062
d2007 -0.109 *** 0.041 -0.225 0.187 -0.222 0.153
constant 6.286 *** 0.514 7.665 *** 1.976 6.416 *** 0.697
average R-sq within 0.064 0.078 0.078
average R-sq between 0.290 0.156 0.303
average R-sq overall 0.242 0.142 0.260
Note: * : 10% significance level; ** : 5% significance level; *** : 1% significance level.
Source: SAVE 2005-2007; restricted sample; unweighted; # obs 6527; # groups 3348;
obs per group: min=1; avg=1.9; max=3; Rubin's rules were used to calculate the coefficients and standard errors.
The coefficients of the additional covariates in the expanded RE model are not shown.  
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Table 12: Specifications 1.) - 5.) of the expanded random effects estimation  
expanded RE 1.) 2.) 3.) 4.) 5.)
log(prec. savings+1) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
log(net income+1) 0.124 ** 0.061 0.136 *** 0.044 0.171 * 0.091 0.088 0.076 0.104 * 0.060
work full -0.057 0.178 -0.001 0.120 0.029 0.281 0.283 0.206 -0.057 0.182
work part 0.149 0.141 0.054 0.105 0.216 0.206 0.303 * 0.181 0.154 0.145
work little 0.212 * 0.125 0.091 0.098 0.274 0.168 0.204 0.170 0.194 0.129
# income sources 0.020 0.038 -0.021 0.028 0.043 0.048 -0.030 0.055 0.027 0.040
high heritage prob. 0.185 0.144 0.163 0.121 0.117 0.204 0.329 0.241 0.199 0.147
unemployed -0.008 0.150 0.062 0.106 0.107 0.220 0.171 0.182 -0.024 0.154
past unemployment -0.004 0.108 -0.118 0.082 0.014 0.163 0.254 0.166 0.010 0.112
retired -0.017 0.164 -0.122 0.121 0.046 0.257 -0.749 * 0.391 0.029 0.173
std(net income)/net income 0.299 0.326 0.198 0.260 0.486 0.417 0.152 0.403 0.248 0.335
sig. earnings fluct. 0.107 0.084 0.083 0.064 0.126 0.115 0.040 0.115 0.094 0.087
slight earnings fluct. 0.080 0.066 0.047 0.048 0.056 0.088 -0.002 0.092 0.074 0.067
pr. unemployment rate -0.090 0.075 -0.031 0.049 -0.034 0.129 -0.060 0.083 -0.091 0.076
exp. years left to live -0.010 ** 0.005 0.000 0.003 -0.008 0.007 -0.012 ** 0.006 -0.009 * 0.005
age 0.013 0.023 0.006 0.019 -0.035 0.050 -0.023 0.040 0.014 0.023
Eastern Germany -0.120 0.287 -0.177 0.268 -0.275 0.385 -0.197 0.392 -0.145 0.346
female -0.139 ** 0.068 -0.056 0.047 -0.072 0.086 -0.094 0.091 -0.116 * 0.069
foreigner 0.350 0.225 0.126 0.205 0.626 * 0.367 0.371 0.284 0.397 0.247
single -0.192 0.223 -0.240 0.164 -0.198 0.297 -0.432 ** 0.213 -0.180 0.229
separated or divorced -0.109 0.192 -0.148 0.130 -0.028 0.289 0.010 0.234 -0.124 0.201
widowed -0.244 0.267 -0.041 0.244 -0.140 0.373 -0.311 0.431 -0.263 0.275
children in hh 0.127 0.124 0.121 0.094 0.134 0.206 -0.121 0.173 0.175 0.126
add. person in hh 0.159 0.140 0.274 ** 0.111 0.089 0.222 -0.028 0.202 0.141 0.148
basic education -0.072 0.195 0.053 0.140 -0.014 0.316 -0.066 0.317 -0.033 0.196
undergr. education 0.463 *** 0.127 0.283 *** 0.098 0.518 ** 0.179 0.239 0.192 0.465 *** 0.133
graduate education 0.286 0.179 0.253 ** 0.111 0.266 0.216 0.058 0.186 0.249 0.202
civil servant 0.191 0.274 0.248 0.248 -0.089 0.331 0.160 0.357 0.220 0.293
selfem. or freelancer -0.086 0.189 0.117 0.129 -0.051 0.264 0.298 0.269 -0.053 0.207
good state of health -0.046 0.068 -0.035 0.053 0.015 0.094 -0.031 0.104 -0.064 0.068
poor state of health -0.126 0.122 -0.026 0.091 -0.154 0.185 0.448 ** 0.215 -0.111 0.127
poor develop. of hh health -0.014 0.081 -0.080 0.066 -0.067 0.116 -0.029 0.146 -0.004 0.083
future income situation 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.008 0.011
develop. own eco. sit. -0.004 0.018 0.000 0.013 -0.017 0.026 -0.029 0.025 0.000 0.019
smoker -0.133 0.147 -0.080 0.099 -0.044 0.213 -0.234 0.185 -0.127 0.150
easy going -0.030 0.100 0.032 0.068 -0.062 0.147 0.294 ** 0.141 -0.031 0.100
risk aversion 0.015 0.018 0.002 0.013 0.019 0.027 0.014 0.026 0.016 0.018
no min. amount -0.215 *** 0.064 -0.071 0.046 -0.257 *** 0.098 -0.183 ** 0.084 -0.218 *** 0.066
no regular saver -0.099 0.065 -0.012 0.050 -0.112 0.094 -0.048 0.095 -0.071 0.066
no liability insurance -0.083 0.115 -0.110 0.087 -0.145 0.153 0.192 0.164 -0.080 0.116
pr. occup. disability ins. 0.082 0.082 0.103 0.068 0.011 0.115 0.174 * 0.106 0.085 0.086
regular support 0.101 0.132 0.033 0.102 -0.208 0.225 0.055 0.154 0.110 0.132
liquidity index -0.052 0.131 0.041 0.085 0.051 0.199 0.045 0.160 -0.047 0.135
overdraft limit 0.020 ** 0.008 0.012 * 0.006 0.022 * 0.013 0.029 * 0.018 0.020 ** 0.009
motive bequest 0.030 ** 0.012 0.024 *** 0.008 0.011 0.017 0.035 ** 0.018 0.031 ** 0.012
motive old-age 0.027 ** 0.012 0.005 0.009 0.029 * 0.017 0.060 *** 0.020 0.024 ** 0.012
business owner 0.131 0.197 0.151 * 0.083 0.045 0.316 0.243 0.222
wealth_1 -0.051 0.075 -0.063 0.128 0.008 0.104 -0.032 0.089
wealth_3 0.041 0.082 0.039 0.130 0.112 0.130 -0.030 0.111
wealth_4 0.125 0.102 0.075 0.190 0.058 0.179 -0.090 0.139
homeowner -0.086 0.114 -0.121 0.205 -0.033 0.196 -0.003 0.159
d2005 -0.583 *** 0.062 -0.119 *** 0.044 -0.521 *** 0.092 -0.528 *** 0.090 -0.594 *** 0.063
d2007 -0.220 0.153 -0.111 0.103 -0.063 0.266 -0.162 0.174 -0.213 0.156
constant 6.125 *** 0.723 6.303 *** 0.464 5.148 *** 0.966 5.553 *** 0.862 6.483 *** 0.707
average R-sq within 0.078 0.032 0.078 0.088 0.079
average R-sq between 0.282 0.301 0.413 0.267 0.297
average R-sq overall 0.242 0.273 0.265 0.218 0.255
# obs 6527 6359 2802 3410 6222
# groups 3348 3271 934 1778 3237
Note: * : 10% significance level; ** : 5% significance level; *** : 1% significance level.
Source: SAVE 2005-2007; restricted sample; unweighted; Rubin's rules were used to calculate the coefficients and 
standard errors. The coefficients of the additional covariates in the expanded RE model are not shown. 
Specification: 1.) without ex ante endogenous variables 4.) restricted to age<=50
2.) restricted to pos. precautionary savings 5.) restricted to non-business owners
3.) restricted to a balanced panel
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7.2 Discussion of the results 
In the next section the results are discussed. Since the risk variables 
are of special interest, this section begins with the description of the 
results related to the risk variables. The rest of the section addresses 
variables which have been found to be significant. If the results are 
not further specified, they refer to the expanded RE estimates of 
table 11.  
Income risk 
The results of table 11 and the robustness checks of table 12 show 
that the forward looking and backward looking measures of income 
risk have the right positive sign (with only one exception, namely 
for slight income fluctuations in the age<= 50 specification, which 
however is close to zero and highly insignificant). Moreover, an 
increase of precautionary savings can be observed from the base 
group with no income fluctuations to the group with slight income 
fluctuations and even stronger to the group with significant income 
fluctuations. The p-value of significant income fluctuations is 20%, 
and the p-value of slight income fluctuations is 22% for the 
expanded RE model. Precautionary savings increase by 10.9% for a 
household with significant income fluctuations compared to a 
household with no income fluctuations, holding all other factors 
constant. The p-value for the forward looking risk measure is 35% 
in the expanded RE model. Thus, as it was already the case in the 
cross-sectional analysis, the forward and backward looking income 
risk variables remain insignificant at the usual significance levels.  
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The reasons for insignificance of the coefficients are multi-layered. 
The questions and the variables constructed from these questions 
could be the first reason. The backward looking risk measure was 
constructed using the question about income fluctuation in the past 
five years. This question does not distinguish between expected and 
unexpected income fluctuations. Only unexpected income 
fluctuation should increase precautionary savings. Seasonal 
workers, freelancers, and self-employed workers may face strong 
but expected income fluctuations. Furthermore, fluctuation or 
variation in income must not be that great of a concern, as long as 
labour income does not fall below a certain income that the 
household wants to maintain in every case. Considering this, 
fluctuations must not be an appropriate measure of labour income 
risk. The shortfall probability can be a better measure of risk. 
However, such a measure is even harder to construct since the 
income bound the household wants to maintain has to be known, 
positive and negative shocks must be distinguished, and the 
magnitude of the shocks should be determined.  
 
The forward looking measure faces the challenge of the very short 
time horizon the households were asked to take into account (on 
average, slightly more than half a year from the point the question 
was asked until the end of that year). If the household heads were 
able to answer this question within the time frame requested, longer 
term labour contracts and zero settings for retirees, civil servants, 
and individuals who were not working may result in many answers 
of no unemployment risk at all (Lusardi, 1997, p. 322), which is 
actually the case (2005: 76.5%; 2006: 71.77%; 2007: 70.31 % for 
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the household head; 2005: 71.82%; 2006: 66.67%; 2007: 65.78% 
for the partner [average over 5 datasets]).   
The general measure of income risk is insignificant too. The 
coefficient is negative and has the opposite sign compared to the 
theoretical prediction. Thus, more individual specific measures of 
risk seem to be more reliable variables to measure the risk exposure 
of an individual.  
 
Another reason why the measurements or proxies for income 
variation have mainly insignificant results is probably due to the 
German social insurance system. Public unemployment insurance 
may reduce the effects of income uncertainty compared to other 
countries like the US. A restriction of the sample to household heads 
not older than 50 years, in which the buffer-stock behaviour is most 
likely to emerge, yields even weaker significance levels.   
Health risk 
Poor expectations about the future health status do not change 
precautionary savings significantly. The coefficient is highly 
insignificant for most of the specifications. The reason for that could 
be based on the German health insurance system, which is 
obligatory for a high proportion of the German population. From 
2004 on, additional payments for medicines and nursing, the 
quarterly medical practice fee, and so on increased. Nevertheless, 
the maximum amount a household has to pay is restricted to 2% of 
its yearly gross income after taking tax exemption limits for families 
into account. An exemption is the restriction to 1% of the gross 
income for individuals who have a chronic disease (Merten, 2003). 
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As noted earlier, the discussion and reformation of the German 
health care system are still in progress. It would be interesting to 
investigate how the effect of this variable will develop in future 
surveys.  
Longevity risk 
The proxy variable for longevity risk, the expected years left to live 
(maximum of the household head or the partner), shows negative 
and significant results for most of the specifications. Already the 
cross-sectional estimates point in this direction. A one year increase 
in the expected years left to live reduces precautionary savings by 
1%. This result is somehow puzzling, since it was expected that with 
increasing years left to live precautionary savings would increase 
due to a longer time horizon for instance in which the household can 
face different kinds of risks such as health risks. A possible 
explanation could be that households having more years left to live 
are healthier households. However, control variables have been 
included to hold factors related to health constant. The expectation 
of more years left to live could be related to a more optimistic view, 
and more optimistic households will also hold less precautionary 
savings. But controlling for optimism does not alter this result. 
Another possibility is that more years left to live are an indicator of 
a less risky life, and this leads to a decrease in precautionary 
savings. To prevent such a relationship, risk aversion was already 
included in the specifications. Moreover, the effects are not 
significant if the sample is restricted to household heads aged 50 or 
below. The coefficient is almost equal to zero if households with no 
precautionary savings are excluded. This result may indicate that 
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households with no precautionary savings do not care much about 
their future and may tend to overestimate their remaining life 
expectancy due to the lack of information about factors that may 
reduce their life expectancy.  
Pension risk 
Since this variable was not available in the 2005 dataset, only the 
cross-sectional analysis of 2006 and 2007 can be used to draw some 
inference (table 10). The variable of pension uncertainty has a p-
value of 13% in 2006 and a p-value of 2% in 2007. On the first 
viewing, the negative sign of pension uncertainty may cause 
amazement. The variable used was taken out of a set of questions in 
which the household head had to guess the percentage of his/her 
pension and that of the partner compared to their anticipated last 
wage. There was also the possibility of an answer of “no guess 
possible”. If there is no guess possible, uncertainty about the future 
pension level must be high. The positive effect could be, however, 
dominated by another effect pointing in the other direction. The 
household head may be less informed about his future pension level, 
since he does not care that much about it. If he does not seriously 
care about it, it is likely that the household head will not care about 
future uncertainty and therewith precautionary savings as well. Even 
if the attempt was done to control for such preference structures, it 
could be that the controls are not able to fully assimilate this effect. 
In addition, especially for younger households it might be more 
difficult to estimate their future pension level than for older 
households. This is confirmed in the negative correlation coefficient 
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of -0.31 between the discussed dummy variable and the age of the 
household head.  
Current Income 
If current monthly net income increases by 10%, precautionary 
savings will increase by 1.24%. The effect is significant throughout 
all specifications (the significance level drops to 25% in only one 
specification). The following calculation should be allowed, 
although only current income and not permanent income is 
available. If a household’s monthly net income, which corresponds 
to the mean monthly net income over the sample, is increased by 
€1,000 (all other factors are held constant by the sample means), 
average precautionary savings will increase by €405 (calculations 
are done using the unweighted sample means over all imputed 
datasets). Evaluated at the 1995 population mean, Kennickell & 
Lusardi (2005, p. 23) found a precautionary savings increase of 
$221 after a “normal” income raise of $1,000.   
Education 
As found in other studies (Arrondel, 2002; Engen & Gruber, 2001; 
Lusardi, 1998) dealing with the precautionary saving motive, 
education has a positive influence on precautionary savings. The 
effect for undergraduate education is highly significant over all 
except for one specification. Graduate education reaches the 5% or 
10% significance level or comes close to the 10% significance level 
in almost all specifications. Whereas the sign of basic education is 
negative compared to the base group (high education), 
undergraduate education results in 47% more precautionary savings 
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compared to the base group. This effect is reduced to a still very 
high increase of 29% for graduate education compared to the base 
group.  
Household composition 
The variables of household composition show a robust pattern over 
all specifications (exception: specification 4). The marital status of 
single, separated or divorced, and widowed lead to at least a 10% 
reduction of precautionary savings compared to the base group of 
married and living with husband/wife. Thus, the protection against 
unforeseen events of the husband or wife living with the household 
head induces higher precautionary savings, holding other influences 
constant. Children and an additional person in the household have 
positive coefficients on precautionary savings as expected. 
Admittedly, all the coefficients are not significant at the usual 
significance levels due to too high standard errors.  
Foreigner 
That foreigners may face additional risks compared to natives is 
indicated by the positive coefficient, which is close to the 10% 
significance level for almost all specifications. A household without 
German citizenship has 34% more precautionary savings than a 
German household with the same characteristics.  
Preferences 
The dummy for holding a certain minimum amount in a current 
account is highly significant if households with zero precautionary 
savings are included in the sample. This variable seems to reflect 
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quite well a precautionary attitude. If a household does not try to 
ensure a minimum amount in his current account, precautionary 
savings are reduced by 22% for unchanged characteristics of the 
household.  
In addition, precautionary savings of households with irregular 
saving behaviour or households with a smoking household head 
have the expected negative coefficients in all specifications but are 
not significant at the usual significance levels.  
 
Moreover, the result of the coefficient of risk aversion is puzzling. 
Even if the coefficient is not significant over different 
specifications, the coefficient unexpectedly depicts the opposite 
sign. An indication for that could already be found in the descriptive 
analysis. In most of the specifications, a one point increase towards 
the direction of not risk-averse at all on a scale from 0 to 10 
increases precautionary savings between 1% and 2%.   
Liquidity index 
Only the overdraft limit in this category shows a significant effect 
over all specifications. In contrast to the expectation, a higher 
overdraft limit of €1,000 increases precautionary savings by 2%. 
Instead of a dominating effect of the possibility to borrow in the 
short-run, this variable may reflect again a precautionary attitude. 
Through this precautionary attitude both the overdraft limit and 
precautionary savings may rise.  
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Insurance 
Private insurance coverage (occupational disability and liability 
insurance) increases precautionary savings at around 8% for each of 
the two private insurances. The signs of the insignificant 
coefficients are stable over the specifications with only one 
exception for the private liability insurance in specification 4. This 
finding suggests that private insurance coverage must be 
endogenous. Starr-McCluer (1996) drew the same conclusion from 
her investigation about the effect of private health insurance 
coverage.  
Other saving motives 
The linkage between different saving motives can be seen in the 
significant coefficients of the bequest and old-age provision 
motives. This effect was also found by Lusardi (1998). A higher 
importance of one point on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 results for 
both motives in an increase of precautionary savings of around 3%. 
Thus, households who tend towards leaving bequest or care about 
their old-age provision accumulate a larger amount of precautionary 
savings, holding other factors constant.  
Further comments  
Before this sections ends, some comments are made about the 
results of variables which have not been mentioned. As presented in 
section 4, the influence of being a business owner is always positive, 
however only once significant at a 10% level. Both proxy variables 
of the expectation about future income growth have small standard 
errors. However, the coefficients are close to zero which leads to 
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insignificant t-values. As can be seen from the intercepts, there is no 
statistically significant difference between 2006 and 2007. In 
contrast to this finding, the dummy coefficient of 2005 is negative 
and highly significant. This confirms the observations already made 
at the beginning of section 4 namely that the unweighted 
distribution of years 2006 and 2007 are similar, whereas both years 
2006 and 2007 differ significantly compared to 2005. Even if the 
sample is restricted to a balanced panel (specification 3), the dummy 
for 2005 remains highly significant. Since the question remained the 
same over all three years, this fact is puzzling. 
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8 Conclusion 
This study has investigated the effects of different factors on a 
subjective measure of precautionary savings in a qualitative and 
quantitative way using the German SAVE dataset 2005-2007. In a 
first step, the development of theoretical models incorporating the 
precautionary saving motive was described with a special focus on 
Carroll’s buffer-stock model (1992, 1997). This dispute helped to 
identify important theoretical variables and their mechanisms to 
influence precautionary savings. The drawbacks of this study may 
be seen in the discussible meaning of the question about the desired 
amount of precautionary savings and the imputation procedure of 
this question, which was inconsistent over the years and not 
appropriate in the author’s opinion. Even if the imputation 
procedure was only a side issue of this study at first, the high item 
non-response rate of the question of concern and the strong effect of 
the imputation of this question on the complete sample made a 
deeper investigation necessary. This investigation concluded with a 
restriction of the sample size to observed values of precautionary 
savings only.  
 
The following descriptive analysis showed amongst other things that 
precautionary savings with a mean of €8,298 (2005-2007, weighted) 
account for 6% of total net wealth and 26% of financial wealth, 
which supports the evidence for a low or at most moderate 
contribution of precautionary savings to wealth accumulation. The 
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problems associated with the empirical estimation of a reduced form 
equation of precautionary savings were discussed in depth.   
 
After the use of panel estimation techniques and the application of 
Rubin’s rules, estimations on the restricted sample present mainly 
insignificant coefficients on the risk variables. Explanations for this 
insignificance range from drawbacks of the constructed variables to 
the reduced risk caused by the German social insurance and welfare 
system. As expected, precautionary savings increase with current 
income. The length of education and professional training has very 
strong effects on the amount of precautionary savings. 
Undergraduate education leads to 47% and graduate education to 
29% higher precautionary savings compared to high education in the 
base group, other relevant factors being equal. The relationships 
between precautionary savings and the old-age as well as the 
bequest motive are also significant and result in an increase in 
precautionary savings caused by an increase in the importance of 
these motives. Behaviour towards a precautionary attitude also has a 
very strong and significant effect. The dummy for holding a certain 
minimum amount in a current account and the amount of the 
overdraft limit point in this direction. There is also some evidence 
that foreigners have additional precautionary savings. 
 
Even if the insignificance of the risk variables are to a certain extent 
disappointing, this study found significant explanatory variables 
even after a rich set of controls were included and sensitivity tests 
were applied. Furthermore, this study contributes by implementing a 
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method to prove the qualitative and quantitative influence of 
variables on a subjective measure of precautionary savings with the 
German SAVE dataset. To improve the further examination of the 
research question, the following advices should be considered: first, 
a more precise and better understandable question about the desired 
amount of precautionary savings in the ongoing SAVE surveys may 
help to reduce the item non-response and the precision of the 
answers themselves; second, a new imputation procedure making 
use of the panel structure of the survey and other estimation 
techniques to allow the estimated values to be only in a defined 
range given by the answers of the respondents may raise the overall 
data quality and prevent a selectivity bias additional to the increase 
in the sample size; third, better specified questions about different 
kinds of risks should help to achieve significant coefficients.  
 
The realisation of the above mentioned improvements would allow 
for investigating this research question again and for researching 
other interesting questions. For instance, different measurements of 
wealth have mainly been used as a proxy for precautionary savings 
so far. How extensive is the bias caused by these proxy variables 
compared to the new subjective measure of precautionary savings? 
This can be investigated by comparing the coefficients and standard 
errors of the explanatory variables estimated with the same 
regression specification only with different explained variables. 
Depending on the definition, wealth can be negative for quite a large 
portion of households. Since the explained variable in my analysis is 
the logarithm of the desired amount of precautionary savings, an 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of wealth (Pence, 2006, pp. 
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5-7; Essig, 2005, pp. 10-11, 48; Carroll & Dynan & Krane, 1999, 
pp. 14-16) with a transformation parameter of θ=1.0516 would offer 
a way to compare the different measures. 
 
Maybe it is in the precautionary saving motive’s nature that many 
questions, e.g., about the strength of the precautionary saving 
motive, its influencing factors, and the magnitude of precautionary 
savings cannot be satisfactorily answered. Thus, the engagement of 
economic research has to continue to better understand this 
important part of households’ saving behaviour.  
                                                     
16 The inverse hyperbolic sine function will be almost equal to the 
logarithm function for a transformation parameter of θ=1.05 and strictly 
positive values. 
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10 Appendix 
Table A.1: Construction of the included variables in the estimated models 
 Variable Description 
precautionary savings 
 log(precautionary  
               _savings+1) 
Logarithm of the amount of desired precautionary savings in € plus €1. 
income and controls 
 log(net income+1) Logarithm of monthly household net income in € plus €1. 
 work_full 
work_part 
work_little 
Dummies for categorical variable “extent of employment” of the household 
head: 
work_full   = 1 if the household head has full-time employment.  
                      (at least 35 hours per week); 0 otherwise. 
work_part  = 1 if the household head has part-time employment. 
                      (at least 15 hours, but less than 35 hours per week);  
                       0 otherwise. 
work_little  = 1 if the level of employment is low or casual. 
                      (less than 15 hours per week); 0 otherwise. 
Base group: not in paid employment. 
 # income sources Number of income sources. 
 highheritage_prob Subjective probability that the household will receive an inheritance or gift 
in the next two years, which significantly improves the household’s 
financial situation. Scale from 0 to 1 with 0.1 increments. 
 unemployed Dummy = 1 if the household head is currently unemployed. 
 past unemployment Dummy = 1 if the household head has ever registered as unemployed. 
 retired Dummy = 1 if the household head is retired. 
income uncertainty 
 std(net income)/net 
income 
Using the question about the subjective probability to loose the current 
place of employment of the household head and the partner in the year of 
the survey, the standard deviation is calculated out of current net income 
and a replacement rate of 60%. It is assumed that there is no correlation of 
the employment status of the household head and his/her partner. The 
standard deviation is divided by the current household net income.  
 significant earnings 
fluctuations 
slight earnings 
fluctuations 
Dummies for subjective ordinal variable “income fluctuation over the last 5 
years”:  
significant earnings fluctuations = 1 if income fluctuates significantly. 
slight earnings fluctuations = 1 if income fluctuates slightly. 
Base group: no earnings fluctuations. 
 provincial 
unemployment rate 
Yearly average unemployment rate of the Federal State the household lives 
in.  
longevity risk & controls 
 expected years left to 
live 
Maximum of the subjective life expectancy minus current age of the 
household head and the partner. 
 age Age in years of the household head. 
socio demographic controls 
 east Dummy = 1 if the household head lives in Eastern Germany. 
 female Dummy = 1 if the household head is female. 
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 foreign Dummy = 1 if the household head is not a German citizen. 
 separated or divorced 
single 
widowed 
Dummies for categorical variable “marital status”:  
Base group: married and living together. 
 
 children in hh Dummy =1 if there lives at least one child inside the household.  
 additional person in 
hh 
Dummy =1 if there lives at least one additional person inside the household, 
which is not the partner or a child.  
 basic education  
undergraduate ed.  
graduate education 
Dummies for categorical variables “highest general school or college 
leaving certificate” and “highest completed training for a professional 
qualification” of the household head: 
basic education  
     = 1 if household head had 9 to 10 years educational training. 
undergraduate ed.  
     = 1 if household head had 16 to 17 years educational training. 
graduate education  
     = 1 if household head had 18 to 19 years educational training. 
Base group: household head had 13 to 14 years educational training. 
 civil servant  
selfemployed or 
freelancer  
 
Dummies for categorical variable “employment status” of the household 
head: 
civil servant = 1 if current type of employment is civil servant. 
selfemployed or freelancer = 1 if current type of employment is self-
employed or freelancer. 
Base group: other jobs or not employed. 
health & controls 
 good state of health 
 
bad state of health 
Dummies for the ordinal variable “subjective current health status” of the 
household head: 
good state of health  
        = 1 if state of health is described as good or very good. 
bad state of health  
        = 1 if state of health is described as bad or very bad. 
Base group: fair state of health  
        = 1 if state of health is described as fair. 
 bad development of 
hh health  
 
Dummy = 1 if the expectation about the own or the partner’s health 
situation on a scale from 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive) is smaller 
than 4.  
expected income growth 
 future income 
situation 
Subjective probability of an increase in the household head’s net income 
one year ahead on a scale from 0 to 10 with 1 increments.  
 develop. own 
economic sit. 
Ordinal variable about the expected development of the own financial 
situation ranging from 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive) with 1 
increments. 
impatience 
 smoker Dummy = 1 if the household head is a smoker.  
 easy going Dummy = 1 if the household head marked less than a 5 on a scale from 0 
(easy going and take each day as it comes) to 10 (exactly planning the 
future).  
preferences 
 risk aversion Average out of five questions about the self-evaluation of taking risks with 
respect to “my own health”, “my career”, “in money matters”, “with respect 
to leisure time and sport”, and “when driving” ranging from 0 (does not 
apply at all) to 10 (applies very well). 
 no min. amount in 
cur. account  
Dummy = 1 if the household head subjectively replies not to ensure that he 
or she has a certain minimum amount in the current account. 
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 no regular saver Dummy for categorical variable “regularity of saving” of the household 
head and the partner. Dummy = 1 if the answers “I/we do not save because 
we do not have enough scope financially to do so” or “I/we do not save 
because we would prefer to enjoy life now” are given. 
Base group: all the other categories. 
insurance 
 pr. occup. disability 
insurance 
Dummy = 1 if the household head or his/her partner is privately insured 
against occupational disability. 
 no liability insurance Dummy = 1 if the household head or his/her partner has no liability 
insurance. 
 regular support Dummy = 1 if the household receives regular support payments exceeding 
€25 per month from persons outside the household.  
liqudity constraints 
 liquidity index 
 
Dummy =1 if a credit has been refused or not granted for the full amount 
requested or the household did not apply for a credit because the household 
members believed that the credit would be refused. 
 overdraft limit 
 
Continuous variable of the agreed amount of overdraft facility. If the 
account has no overdraft facility, the value is set to zero.  
other saving motives 
 motive bequest 
  
Absolute importance of the bequest motive on a scale from 0 (totally 
unimportant) to 10 (very important) with 1 increments. 
 motive old-age Absolute importance of the old-age provision motive on a scale from 0 
(totally unimportant) to 10 (very important) with 1 increments. 
business 
 business owner Dummy =1 if the household head or the partner own any business assets. 
wealth controls 
 homeowner Dummy = 1 if the household owns a home. 
 wealth_1 
wealth_3 
wealth_4 
Dummies for each total net wealth (i.e., savings investments, building 
society savings, whole life insurance policies, savings bonds, share- and 
real-estate bonds, occupational and private pension schemes, real estate, 
business wealth etc.) quartile of the household: 
wealth_1 = 1 if total net wealth <= 3,000. 
wealth_3 = 1 total net wealth > 63,000 & total net wealth <= 222,000. 
wealth_4 = 1 total net wealth > 222,000. 
Base group: wealth_2 = 1 if total net wealth > 3,000  
                                          & total net wealth <= 63,000.                                    
year dummies 
 d2005 
d2007 
Dummy = 1 if the year of the survey is 2005.  
Dummy = 1 if the year of the survey is 2007. 
Base group: d2006 = 1 if the year of the survey is 2007. 
uncertainty of pension (only 2006 + 2007) 
 uncertain pension Dummy = 1 if the respondent was not able to give an estimate of the 
percentage of the anticipated last wage/salary the household head or the 
partner will receive as their pension. 
insurance (only 2007) 
 obligation to contr. to 
social ins. 
Dummy = 1 if the household head has an obligation to contribute to the 
social insurance system.  
 private long-term 
care insurance 
Dummy = 1 if the household head has a private long-term care insurance 
and no social long-term care insurance. 
 add. long-term care 
ins. 
Dummy = 1 if the household head has additional to the social long-term 
care insurance a private long-term care insurance. 
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Table A.2: Item non-response rates for the variables included in the 
analysis 
name of variable abbr. in SAVE 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
precautionary savings
log(precautionary_savings+1) fes3o 504 894 757 21.9% 25.7% 25.8%
income & controls
log(net income+1) f54o1 367       -       - 15.9% - -
f54o2 316       -       - 20.8% - -
f55o       - 553 342 - 15.9% 11.6%
level of employment f22s1 12 22 16 0.5% 0.6% 0.5%
# income sources f53m1_`k' 134 130 11 5.8% 3.7% 0.4%
high heritage probability f88g1 30 90 127 1.3% 2.6% 4.3%
f88g2 12 49 95 0.8% 2.1% 4.8%
f89s 197 706 585 41.8% 79.1% 74.1%
unemployed f23s1 60 125 69 2.6% 3.6% 2.4%
past unemployment f26s1 28 81 6 1.2% 2.3% 0.2%
retired f60s 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
f61s 0 9 0 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%
income uncertainty
std(net income)/net income f87g1 29 88 59 1.3% 2.5% 2.0%
f87g2 18 70 64 1.2% 3.0% 3.3%
f55o1       - 133 129 - 5.7% 6.6%
earnings fluctuations f59s 51 121 245 2.2% 3.5% 8.3%
longevity risk & controls
expected years left to live² f90o1 85 101 217 3.7% 2.9% 7.4%
f90o2 92 118 199 4.0% 3.4% 6.8%
f91s 83 118 110 3.6% 3.4% 3.7%
f91o1 52 93 114 12.4% 13.6% 17.7%
f91o2 54 54 30 9.8% 8.5% 6.0%
age partner f11o 8 6 13 0.5% 0.3% 0.7%
age f07o 16 1 0 0.7% 0.0% 0.0%
socio demographic controls
Eastern/ Western Germany bula 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
female f06s 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
foreigner f08s 9 3 1 0.4% 0.1% 0.0%
marital status f09s 2 11 23 0.1% 0.3% 0.8%
children in hh f14o 17 85 132 0.7% 2.4% 4.5%
additional person in hh f17s 15 59 73 0.7% 1.7% 2.5%
education f20s1 16 8 3 0.7% 0.2% 0.1%
f21s1 153 9 1 6.6% 0.3% 0.0%
job f24s1 65 146 68 2.8% 4.2% 2.3%
health & controls
state of health fg1s1 5 23 30 0.2% 0.7% 1.0%
development of hh health f85g3 18 73 72 0.8% 2.1% 2.5%
f85g4 7 41 42 0.5% 1.7% 2.1%
expected income growth
future income situation f86g1 19 92 93 0.8% 2.6% 3.2%
develop. own economic sit. f86g2 13 85 80 0.6% 2.4% 2.7%
impatience
smoker f94s 6 25 26 0.3% 0.7% 0.9%
easy going f100p1 2 61 39 0.1% 1.8% 1.3%
missing values
abs. number in %¹
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name of variable abbr. in SAVE 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
preferences
risk aversion f98bg1 20 110 125 0.9% 3.2% 4.3%
f98bg2 340 511 502 14.8% 14.7% 17.1%
f98bg3 39 159 164 1.7% 4.6% 5.6%
f98bg4 66 202 217 2.9% 5.8% 7.4%
f98bg5 160 214 222 6.9% 6.2% 7.6%
min. amount in cur. account f50s 85 125 102 3.7% 3.6% 3.5%
saver type f37s 24 86 69 1.0% 2.5% 2.4%
insurance
liability insurance f97s 22 115 138 1.0% 3.3% 4.7%
pr. occup. disability insurance f96s 39 185 188 1.7% 5.3% 6.4%
regular support f57bs 30 6 3 1.3% 0.2% 0.1%
obligation to contr. to social ins. f27s1       -       - 93 - - 3.2%
long-term care insurance fg10s       -       - 22 - - 0.7%
add. long-term care ins. fg11s       -       - 65 - - 2.5%
liqudity constraints
liquidity index fes1s 39 99 67 1.7% 2.8% 2.3%
fes2s 45 131 131 2.0% 3.8% 4.5%
overdraft limit fes5o 243 369 261 13.9% 13.3% 11.1%
other saving motives
motive bequest f46ag4 101 475 441 4.4% 13.7% 15.0%
motive old-age f46g4 63 315 2684 2.7% 9.1% 91.4%
motive precautionary f46g2 58 171 269 2.5% 4.9% 9.2%
business
business owner f81s 69 183 159 3.0% 5.3% 5.4%
wealth controls
homeowner f66s 11 42 44 0.5% 1.2% 1.5%
wealth³
uncertainty of pension
uncertain pension f65s1       - no missing values available
pension not uncertain f65s2       - no missing values available
year dummies
d2005; d2007 year 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Note: The list includes all variables to construct the variables included in the analysis.
When the variable was already listed for the construction of a variable before, the variable is not listed again. 
¹Percentages of missings as a % of those who had to answer this question. 
If the superior question was not answered, this was count as an missing of the following question too.
²Observed values were replaced in 2005 and 2006 to make answers consistent.
³Since of the multitude of variables, the variables from which the wealth variable is constructed are not listed.
See Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) for missing rates of selected assets.
4In 2007 only 255 households were asked to answer the question about the importance of savings for the old-age provision 
by mistake. To fill the gaps of this question a special imputation procedure was written to make use of the panel structure 
of the dataset.
Source: SAVE 2005-2007, unrestricted sample.
abs. number in %¹
missing values
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Table A.3: Literature overview 
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